RO-2024-102

Workers in orange high-vis on a train track near a level crossing
Track workers near a level crossing
Freight Train 882, near miss with track workers, Main South Line, Hornby 27 km, 7 March 2024
Status
Closed
Occurrence Date
Report Publication Date
Jurisdiction
NZ
What happened
On 7 March 2024, Fulton Hogan Limited (Fulton Hogan) was undertaking construction work within the rail corridor on the Main South Line, between the intersections of Halswell Junction Road and Parker Street at Hornby, Christchurch.

The protection arrangement for track workers accessing the rail corridor was compulsory-stop protection managed by Fulton Hogan’s trainee Rail Protection Officer (RPO) and a supervising RPO.

While working under the compulsory-stop protection, the trainee RPO authorised two trains to pass through the worksite while track workers were clear of the track.

After the first train had cleared the worksite, the trainee RPO authorised the track workers to access the track to commence work before the second train had passed through the worksite.

At about 0900 the level-crossing protection alarms at Halswell Junction Road and Parker Street activated, with bells ringing. The track workers realised that a train was approaching the worksite and left the track for the safe place . No one was injured.

Why it happened
The trainee RPO was carrying out tasks that required a high level of proficiency. They were unsupervised, had limited experience and became distracted. This led to an important step in the process of track protection being missed.

The supervising RPO was absent while the trainee RPO was performing the safety-critical tasks associated with track protection. The trainee RPO did not register that they had not followed the accepted practice of authorising track workers to enter the rail corridor only when the worksite was clear of rail traffic, and the supervising RPO was not available to provide the guidance necessary to rectify the situation.

The supervising RPO had not been provided with any additional training in coaching and mentoring personnel undertaking safety-critical roles, and the level of supervision required had not been clearly articulated or documented.

What we can learn
Providing adequate training for supervisors is necessary to ensure that there is a clear understanding of what adequate supervision means and its importance in maintaining safety, particularly where supervision relates to mentoring and coaching trainees conducting safety-critical tasks.

Who may benefit
The lessons from this incident will benefit all industries where the supervision of safety-critical tasks performed by inexperienced or unqualified staff is necessary to maintain safety.