MO-2022-201 Charter fishing vessel Enchanter, Capsize, North Cape, New Zealand, 20 March 2022

What happened

1. The charter fishing vessel Enchanter was on a five-day fishing trip from Mangōnui in Northland to the Three Kings Islands with eight passengers and two crew on board. On 20 March 2022, it was heading back from the Three Kings Islands towards Murimotu Island off North Cape, where the skipper intended to anchor for the night.
2. At about 1950 the vessel was broadly east of Murimotu Island when it was struck on its port side by a large steep wave, rapidly rolling the vessel onto its side. The superstructure comprising the main saloon and the flybridge separated from the hull and the Enchanter capsized.
3. The New Zealand Rescue Coordination Centre (the RCC) was alerted to the accident by the crew activating their Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) and initiated a search and rescue response.
4. Only five of the ten people survived the accident. The survivors were retrieved from the upturned hull and other floating debris by the first rescue helicopter to arrive at the scene. The bodies of the remaining five people were recovered after an almost two-day search and rescue operation involving multiple aircraft and surface vessels.

Why it happened

1. The Enchanter should easily have coped with the sea conditions off North Cape at the time of the accident. However, it is about as likely as not the vessel had strayed into shallower water off Murimotu Island, an area that is prone to occasional, naturally occurring, larger waves peaking as they entered the shallowing water.
2. When the Enchanter rapidly rolled onto its side, the force of the water exceeded the design parameters of the vessel’s superstructure. This caused the superstructure to separate from the hull, resulting in the Enchanter fully capsizing.
3. Due to the suddenness of the capsize none of the people were wearing or had access to life jackets, and the life rafts likely did not automatically deploy, which left those in the water with no or limited means of flotation.
4. None of the four lifebuoys on board had effective retroreflective tape and only two had a strobe light attached. Add to this the absence of life jackets with their strobe lights and retroreflective markings, it would have been difficult to detect the missing people in the water at night.
5. There was a significant delay in the search for the five missing people while fuel for the rescue helicopters was sourced. Three of the missing people were alive in the water when last seen by the survivors but were later found deceased.
6. Although we cannot determine with any certainty whether it would have changed the outcome in this particular situation, the chances of survival after an accident are greater if search and rescue operations are conducted promptly.

What we can learn

1. For any forecast or actual sea conditions, mariners should at any time expect to encounter occasional waves up to twice the average size.
2. Mariners should, if possible, avoid navigating in shallow water in adverse wave conditions. If shallow water cannot be avoided, they should be particularly vigilant and expect waves much larger and steeper than those expected in deeper water.
3. It is important that passengers either practise putting on a life jacket or are given a demonstration of how to do so during a safety briefing, rather than having to work this out under the pressure of an emergency.
4. Safety will be better served if life jackets are distributed in several places around a vessel where they will be more accessible in a sudden emergency.
5. Wearing an inflatable life jacket or similar buoyancy aid will enhance the safety of people when fishing from open decks in open and exposed waters.
6. There is safety benefit in wearing a personal locator beacon as a backup to the EPIRBs required on commercial vessels, in case the circumstances of an accident prevent the use of the latter.
7. Fitting an Automatic Identification System (AIS) or equivalent tracking device to a vessel will significantly improve the likelihood of being found and reduce the time for being rescued, particularly if the primary life-saving equipment fails or cannot be activated.

Who may benefit

1. All mariners, maritime regulatory agencies, and agencies and operators involved in search and rescue operations.

Background

1. The Enchanter was a 16.2-metre charter fishing vessel operated by Enchanter Fishing Charters, primarily out of Mangōnui in Northland, New Zealand. A group of eight people had booked a five-day fishing charter out of Mangōnui to the Three Kings Islands, beginning on Thursday 17 March 2022.

Narrative

1. The eight people (passengers) arrived on board the Enchanter on Wednesday 16 March 2022 and spent the night on board at the berth in Mangōnui. The next morning 17 March 2022, the skipper gave the passengers a safety briefing, which included the location and operation of the various life-saving apparatus. The passengers were told that all the life jackets were stowed under the bunks in the forward passenger cabin but were not shown what they looked like or how to put them on.
2. The Enchanter departed Mangōnui at about 0830 with the skipper, first mate and the eight passengers on board. The Enchanter towed fishing lures for the trip to the Three Kings Islands and anchored in Northwest Bay on Great Island for the night (see Figure 3). The weather was fine with light winds.

1. On 18 March 2022 the Enchanter went to Middlesex Bank to fish for the day and returned to Northwest Bay on Great Island for the night. Again, the weather was fine with light winds.
2. On 19 March 2022 the Enchanter went to King Bank to fish for the day and returned to Little Bear Bay on Great Island for the night. Again, the weather was fine with light winds.
3. The skipper chose Little Bear Bay on the southwest side of Great Island to shelter from forecast northeast conditions associated with a weather system that was to pass over the area during the night.
4. The weather system passed through the area as forecast. At about 0600 on 20 March 2022 it was still raining and the winds were strong from the northeast. The Enchanter remained at the Little Bear Bay anchorage while the passengers breakfasted and fished in the bay. The weather began to ease, so at about 1030 the Enchanter left Little Bear Bay and headed for the Princes Islands about five nautical miles (nm) to the northwest. There they fished in the lee of the islands until 1330, at which time the skipper judged the sea conditions had eased sufficiently to make the journey to North Cape. Their intention was to anchor for the night in the lee of Murimotu Island (see Figure 2).
5. The weather conditions for the first part of what was to be about a seven-hour trip were described as between two- and three-metre waves with the wind still blowing about 20 knots from the northeast.
6. By 1700 the weather had cleared, and the sea conditions eased enough for the skipper to allow the passengers to open the side windows to the main saloon. They also deployed the towed fishing lures.
7. At 1940 the skipper called Far North Radio on the VHF radio and advised of their intention to anchor for the night ‘under’ Murimotu Island. It was agreed that the skipper would call Far North Radio once the Enchanter was anchored, in approximately one hour.
8. As the Enchanter closed with the coastline near North Cape, six of the passengers were relaxing in the saloon, one was asleep in the forward cabin and one was seated on the aft deck monitoring the fishing rods. The first mate was in the galley cooking the evening meal and the skipper was on the flybridge navigating the vessel. The Enchanter was being steered by autopilot. During an initial interview the skipper said that they had “just started to turn to get us down” (indicating a change in heading to head more southerly). This was when the vessel was broadly north-northeast of Murimotu Island and before it reached a waypoint (a specified point on a chart for a planned passage) on the chart plotter, which the skipper indicated was broadly east-southeast of Murimotu Island. The skipper later clarified that only one course adjustment of about 10 degrees in a southerly direction had been made on the automatic pilot, and that this was to regain the track to this waypoint.
9. The sky was clear, and it was just on dark. At about 1950 the vessel encountered a large steep wave on its port side. The wave rolled the vessel to starboard in an instant. The superstructure and windows on the starboard side were forced into the water and imploded. The vessel continued to roll and capsized. During the capsize sequence the superstructure comprising the main saloon and flybridge separated from the hull. The hull remained inverted but afloat. The floor of the flybridge (which was the roof of the main saloon below) lay inverted, floating next to the capsized hull.
10. Seven of the eight passengers and the first mate were either ejected or escaped from the vessel into the water. The passenger who was sleeping in the forward cabin was trapped there. The skipper was able to escape from the inverted flybridge.
11. Within minutes of the accident, the first mate climbed on top of the inverted hull and made a headcount. Including the first mate, nine people had survived the initial capsize. Two (the skipper and one passenger) had climbed on top of the inverted flybridge, the first mate and two passengers were on the inverted hull, and four passengers were in the water. One of those four in the water had retrieved a lifebuoy, which they had placed over their head and under their armpits.
12. Within minutes the first mate noticed another of the four passengers in the water floating face down. The first mate entered the water and attempted revival while swimming the passenger to the inverted flybridge. Despite the combined efforts of those on the inverted flybridge, the passenger remained unresponsive. Sometime later the body drifted away from the flybridge despite attempts to secure it to the flybridge.
13. Sometime before 2017, the Enchanter’s Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) surfaced next to the skipper. The EPIRB had been secured in a float-free bracket on the deck at the back of the flybridge (now underneath the inverted flybridge floor). The EPIRB was designed to float free from its bracket when submerged and automatically activate. However, the EPIRB had not activated so it was manually activated and tied to the inverted flybridge.
14. Meanwhile the inverted hull and flybridge had drifted apart. At that time the situation was:
    • two passengers were on the inverted hull (2)
    • the skipper, first mate and one passenger were on the inverted flybridge (3)
    • three passengers were last seen alive in the water, one with a lifebuoy (3)
    • one passenger was assumed deceased and in the water (1)
    • one passenger was unaccounted for. (1)

Search and rescue

1. At 2017 the New Zealand Rescue Coordination Centre (the RCC) received an initial beacon alert from the Enchanter’s EPIRB, indicating a distress off North Cape. Using the registration details for the EPIRB the RCC contacted the Enchanter’s shore base and established that the Enchanter was operating near North Cape. At about 2020 the RCC received the first encoded (see Appendix 5 for a detailed description of the data obtained from the EPIRB) transmission from the EPIRB, which included global positioning system (GPS) coordinates.
2. At 2030 the RCC directed the Marine Operations Centre to issue mayday relays on VHF Channel 16, requesting all vessels in the vicinity to aid in the response. There were no vessels in the immediate area at that time.
3. At about 2035 the RCC briefed the Coastguard New Zealand (Coastguard) Duty Officer, who was based in Auckland. Coastguard’s northernmost unit, Coastguard Houhora, was then tasked to respond. The RCC also tasked (assigned as an asset to be used for the SAR event) the Northland Emergency Services Trust (NEST) helicopter crew based in Whangarei. The NEST crew gave an estimated time to departure of 20–30 minutes.

1. At 2109 Coastguard advised the RCC that, having conducted a risk assessment, they would not be able to respond at night due to the limitations of their vessel and the severity of the weather forecast. They also believed that there would be no air support in the area until the weather abated. At 2110 NEST advised the RCC there would be a delay while they assembled the appropriate helicopter crew. NEST also requested the RCC to task another helicopter from the Auckland Rescue Helicopter Trust (ARHT) to assist with the response, which the RCC completed at approximately 2200.
2. At 2205 the NEST helicopter departed from Whangarei. NEST maintained a fuel trailer at Kaitaia Hospital. As this was the most northerly point where fuel would be available, both helicopter crews planned to land and refuel from the trailer to maximise their time on scene at North Cape (see Figure 4)
3. At 2250 the NEST helicopter arrived at Kaitaia Hospital to refuel and at 2313 departed Kaitaia, heading for the position coordinates transmitted by the Enchanter’s EPIRB. Meanwhile the ARHT helicopter departed from Ardmore Aerodrome in Auckland at 2252. The NEST helicopter arrived on scene at about 2340 and immediately detected two light sources. The first was a strobe light in the water. However, it was not attached to anything.
4. The second light source was from the vessel’s EPIRB attached to the inverted flybridge, to which the skipper, first mate and one passenger were clinging. The helicopter crew conducted a risk assessment and then lowered a rescue swimmer to the water. The three survivors were then winched on board one-by-one, accompanied by the rescue swimmer.
5. By now, New Zealand Police (NZ Police) had been briefed and had set up a forward command post at Te Hapua, the closest point to the search area with road access. At 0013 the NEST helicopter departed the scene and flew the three rescued survivors to Te Hapua, where they were transferred to ambulance staff. While in flight the helicopter crew learned from the survivors that: two people were last seen sitting on the inverted hull; three were in the water; one was in the water (but likely deceased); and one was unaccounted for (but was likely trapped in the inverted hull).
6. The NEST helicopter returned immediately to the scene to resume the search. They detected another light source that proved to be from the two passengers on the inverted hull. One of the passengers had used the light from a mobile phone to attract their attention. They had earlier tried to make an emergency 111 call but were unsuccessful because of poor mobile coverage in the area. In a similar fashion to the first retrieval the two passengers were retrieved by 0108. The helicopter crew decided to fly these two survivors directly to Kaitaia Hospital as the helicopter was running low on fuel.
7. Meanwhile, the ARHT helicopter had stopped at North Shore Aerodrome to pick up a more experienced winch operator, then at Dargaville to top up with fuel, and again at Kaitaia Hospital to top up with fuel from the NEST trailer before heading to the scene. The two helicopters passed each other in flight and exchanged information.
8. The NEST helicopter landed at Kaitaia Hospital and transferred the two passengers to medical staff. The helicopter crew then refuelled from the fuel trailer. However, there was not enough fuel remaining to return to the scene, so that helicopter remained at Kaitaia Hospital.
9. The ARHT helicopter arrived on scene at 0130 to begin the search for the five missing people. Meanwhile, the RCC had also tasked a Royal New Zealand Airforce P3 Orion aeroplane (P3) to assist in the search. The P3 arrived on scene at about the same time as the ARHT helicopter. The RCC assigned the P3 as on-scene coordinator circling at a higher altitude. The helicopter searched at a lower level in the dark for about an hour and 20 minutes before it too ran low on fuel and landed at the Te Hapua forward command post at 0257
10. Meanwhile, a fuel tanker had been sourced at Kerikeri and was sent northwards, arriving at Kaitaia Hospital at 0511. The NEST helicopter was refuelled, but by then the helicopter crew had exceeded the limits of their work/rest operational hours, thus preventing them from rejoining the search effort. The fuel tanker then travelled north to Te Hapua forward command post, arriving there at about 0700. The ARHT helicopter refuelled and departed for the search area again at 0733. For 4 hours and 36 minutes there were no helicopter air assets able to search because no fuel was available.
11. Meanwhile, several vessels had responded to the mayday relay calls. Another of the operator’s fishing charter vessels Pacific Invader had departed Mangōnui and arrived at the search area at 0400. A commercial fishing vessel Florence Nightingale, which had been out at the Three Kings Islands at the time of the accident, arrived soon after 0400. Another commercial fishing vessel Katrina arrived at the search area at about 0612. All three vessels were coordinated into a search pattern or directed to items of interest by the P3 circling above.
12. At about 0710 (first light) the body of one of the passengers was located and recovered by one of the surface search vessels. When the refuelled ARHT helicopter had returned on scene, it took over as the on-scene coordinator from the P3, which was by then getting low on fuel. The bodies of another two passengers were recovered over the next 40 minutes, leaving two people still missing.
13. Meanwhile, preparing for an extended search operation, the RCC had tasked a second rescue helicopter from AHRT. This second helicopter arrived at the forward command post at 0907 and relieved the first helicopter.
14. When the mayday relays had been broadcast, the inshore patrol vessel HMNZS Taupo had been operating in the Hauraki Gulf. It diverted to the search area, arriving on scene at 1110. The RCC assigned HMNZS Taupo with the role of on-scene coordinator, tasked with ensuring all marine assets were searching the designated areas assigned by the RCC. However, the HMNZS Taupo misunderstood the meaning of on-scene coordinator and assumed the naval warfare role of on-scene command, effectively taking control of the search away from RCC.
15. Over the following hours multiple assets joined the search including Coastguard Houhora, two other commercial helicopters from Kerikeri and another P3.
16. At 1319 the body of a fourth passenger was located and recovered, leaving one passenger still missing. By 1527 the RCC had realised that air assets were not following their assigned search patterns. HMNZS Taupo had directed all assets to search another area, based on their own drift-modelling calculations. After some discussion with HMNZS Taupo, the RCC took back control of the search area.
17. Meanwhile the RCC had tasked the NZ Police Dive Squad to fly up from Wellington to dive on the hull in anticipation of locating the final missing passenger. The Dive Squad arrived in the area by 1953 and prepared to dive at first light the following morning, 22 March 2022.
18. By 2020 all assets on site had been stood down for the evening. HMNZS Taupo had marked the hull by attaching a rope with a white buoy earlier in the afternoon. The P3 recorded the GPS coordinates of the hull before leaving the scene.
19. However, the following morning the inverted hull could not be located. A helicopter was tasked with searching for the upturned hull. At 1239 the hull was located and the vessel with the NZ Police Dive Squad on board was directed to that location. The body of the last missing passenger was recovered from the hull at 1654, marking the end of the search and rescue task.

Salvage

1. In the days after the completion of the search and rescue task, the inverted hull of the Enchanter was taken under tow, as it was considered a danger to surface navigation. However, as soon as the tow began, the hull rolled back upright and then sank in about 24 metres water depth.
2. The tow vessel then attempted to drag the hull across the seabed into deeper water (the wreck was considered to be at a depth where it would be a hazard to recreational divers). However, the manoeuvre was unsuccessful and, according to divers who were on board the tow vessel, the hull sustained significant damage when it was dragged into an underwater rocky outcrop. Survivors and search and rescue personnel described the bottom of the hull as being undamaged before it sank.
3. On 31 March 2022, the sunken hull was raised to the surface and towed to a private launching ramp just inside the entrance to Houhora Harbour. The hull was grounded in the mud at high water. When the tide receded, the hull was winched through the mud to a point where the Commission was able to conduct a thorough inspection. (See Figure 5 and Appendix 4 for photographs taken during this inspection.)

1. Neither the flybridge from which three survivors were rescued nor any of the structure that formed the main saloon and supported the flybridge was recovered.
2. The suite of navigation equipment located on the flybridge was also lost. A second GPS located in the skipper’s cabin was retrieved. Despite having been submerged in salt water for several days, the Commission was able to extract data from the memory chip. However, the GPS was an older model, so the data was encrypted in a format that yielded no useful track coordinates.

Meteorological information

1. The location of the accident off North Cape lay between two MetService forecast sea areas. The Three Kings Islands lay within the Kaipara forecast area and the destination anchorage behind Murimotu Island lay just within the Brett forecast sea area (see Figure 6).

1. On the day of the accident the weather situation consisted of a low-pressure system, which was lying in the Tasman Sea to the west of North Island extending a series of fronts across Northland. There was a strong northeast flow ahead of these fronts (see Figure 7).

2. The forecast for the sea area Kaipara issued by MetService at 2248 on 19 March 2022 (the evening before the accident) was:

   Sunday 20 March 2022

   Northeast 25 knots, rising to 35 knots this morning, changing northerly 15 knots north of Kaipara Harbour this evening. Sea becoming very rough, easing in the north. Long period southwest swell 2 metres developing. Northeast swell rising to 2 metres in the north. Poor visibility in scattered rain, with possible thunderstorms.

   Monday 21 March 2022

   Becoming northerly 10 knots everywhere early, rising to 20 knots offshore late. Very rough sea in the south easing. Moderate southwest swell easing. Moderate northeast swell in the north.

3. The forecast for the sea area Brett issued by MetService at 2248 on 19 March 2022 (the evening before the accident) was:

   Sunday 20 March 2022

   Northeast 25 knots, rising to 30 knots early afternoon. Sea becoming very rough. Northeast swell rising to 2 metres. Poor visibility in rain with possible thunderstorms from afternoon.

   Monday 21 March 2022

   Becoming northerly 10 knots early. Very rough sea easing. Moderate northeast swell.

1. The skipper had access to the MetService information, but primarily relied on the PredictWind subscription weather service, specifically the Global Forecast System (GFS). The skipper frequently monitored these resources and concluded that the weather forecast was suitable for the fishing charter trip to proceed.
2. The skipper had previously discussed the weather forecast with the charter group organiser. They acknowledged the frontal system that was predicted to pass over Northland over-night on Saturday 19 March 2022 with associated strong winds and rain. They agreed they had various options available should the predicted adverse weather eventuate.
3. The weather conditions for the first three days of the trip were as predicted: fine weather with low swell and little wind. The skipper frequently monitored the weather forecast as the trip progressed and kept the passengers well informed. On Saturday 19 March 2022 the skipper noted that the cold front associated with the low pressure in the Tasman Sea was still predicted to pass the Three Kings Islands from the northwest early on the morning of Sunday 20 March 2022. The skipper adjusted the plan. The Enchanter remained in the sheltered anchorage until mid-morning and then, as the front was still passing, they travelled to and fished in the lee of the Princes Islands.
4. By 1330 the weather had cleared, the wind had backed (the wind direction changed or trended anticlockwise) to approximately north-northeast (blowing from about 25 degrees) direction and dropped to 15 to 20 knots. The Enchanter left the Princes Islands for the six-hour trip to North Cape, essentially following the weather system that had passed through.
5. There are no wave-recording devices located in the sea area around North Cape and the Three Kings Islands. The survivors’ estimates of the wave conditions for the trip back were reasonably consistent: about 2.5 metres average at the start and easing to about 1.5 metres average as the Enchanter progressed towards North Cape. (See Appendix 1 for a description of wave formation and characteristics.)
6. The seawater temperature round the North Cape area was about 22 degrees Celsius.

Vessel information

1. In 1981 the Enchanter was designed initially as a14.2-metre motorsailer but before it was built the owner altered the design to a Class X commercial fishing vessel. The Enchanter was built as such in 1982. The vessel was built using fibreglass over double-diagonal kauri plank with a single-deck superstructure built in marine plywood (no flybridge).
2. In 1984 the Enchanter was modified to be a passenger vessel, and it is thought that a semi-open flybridge was added on top of the main saloon at that time (records were hard copy at that time and not always complete).
3. In 1993 the vessel was lengthened by two metres at the stern. The Enchanter was purchased by the current owner in 2004 (initially the vessel was purchased by the current owner as part of a partnership, before forming a company).
4. In 2009 the vessel was resurveyed to allow it to operate further from the coast, within Coastal (Maritime Rules Part 20 Operating Limits, Section 20.2(a) Coastal Limits [50 nautical miles off the coastline]) and Restricted Offshore Limits (Maritime Rules Part 20 Operating Limits, Section 20.2(a) Offshore Limits [outside Coastal Limits out to 200 nautical miles off the coastline but restricted by the surveyor in this case to l00 nautical miles]). The flybridge was enclosed with glass windows and the helm station in the main saloon was removed, leaving the only control console located on the flybridge.
5. The Enchanter had sleeping quarters for eight people in the cabin below and forward of the main saloon and for two crew in a cabin behind and below the main saloon.
6. Propulsion was by twin diesel engines giving a service speed of about eight knots.

New Zealand search and rescue system

1. New Zealand is responsible for one of the largest search and rescue (SAR) regions in the world, covering over 30 million square kilometres (see Figure 8).

1. The coordination of SAR operations for the region is divided into two categories. Category I SAR operations are coordinated by NZ Police at a local level, covering searches within New Zealand on land, inland waterways and close-to-shore marine operations. Category II SAR operations are coordinated at a national level by the RCC. These operations typically involve missing aircraft, aircraft in distress and offshore marine operations within New Zealand’s SAR region.
2. The New Zealand Search and Rescue Council (NZSAR Council) and the NZSAR Secretariat provide strategic oversight and governance for the SAR sector. The NZSAR Council comprises leaders from the Ministry of Transport, the Civil Aviation Authority, Fire and Emergency New Zealand, Maritime New Zealand, New Zealand Defence Force, NZ Police, Department of Conservation, as well as an independent member.
3. The NZSAR Secretariat provides the NZSAR Council with advice and support services, as well as providing leadership to the sector by implementing measures to promote strategic coordination (see Figure 9).

1. SAR coordinators are provided by NZ Police or the RCC depending on the category of the SAR operation. They can task several types of assets provided by several agencies and private operators. These include helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, vessels, land vehicles and people. The majority of SAR personnel are volunteers. According to the NZSAR Annual Report 2021 the sector consists of 11,561 personnel, of which 91 per cent are volunteers (see Figure 10).

Assets

Helicopters

1. For SAR operations, NZSAR coordinators can task helicopters from the New Zealand Defence Force, NZ Police and civilian operators.
2. The initial responding helicopters tasked by the RCC to search for the Enchanter were medical service helicopters provided by NEST and ARHT. The helicopters are civilian operated and have operational agreements with the National Ambulance Sector Office (NASO) to serve as regional air ambulances.
3. For operators to maintain their NASO agreement, they must meet the criteria outlined in the NZ Aeromedical and Air Rescue Standard. This document was created by NASO to enforce standardisation of aircraft, equipment and training among the different civilian operators to better serve the health sector.
4. To better serve New Zealand, the NASO agreement allows for air ambulances to be used for the purposes of search and rescue when they are not being used for medical purposes.
5. Other civilian operators may also be tasked for search and rescue operations depending on the needs of the operation and availability of aircraft. These assets may be lacking some of the equipment and/or personnel that come with a NASO aircraft, such as not being winch capable and/or not having paramedics onboard.

New Zealand Defence Force and NZ Police

1. The RNZAF’s No. 3 Squadron is equipped with a fleet of eight NH-90 helicopters based at RNZAF Base Ohakea, Manawatu. The No. 3 Squadron always has one aircraft and crew on 24-hour standby and can be airborne within two hours of notification.
2. NZ Police operate the Eagle fleet of three Bell 429 helicopters all based out of Auckland. They are used for a variety of NZ Police operations including search and rescue. However, their uses are limited by not being winch capable.

Fixed-wing aircraft

1. The RNZAF maintained a fleet of P-3K2 Orion aircraft (No. 5 Squadron), and C-130 Hercules aircraft (No. 40 Squadron) both of which were long-range aircraft (at the time of publication of this report the P3-K2 had been replaced by the P-8A, a more modern similar-sized jet aircraft suited for long-range SAR operations). These large aircraft were essential in providing coverage for New Zealand’s broad search and rescue region extending from Antarctica to several Pacific islands. One aircraft was on 24-hour standby and could be airborne within two hours of notification.
2. Coastguard New Zealand operates two small Cessna 182 aircraft, which are crewed by volunteers. These aircraft provide a visual search platform and are based in Auckland (Ardmore) and Northland (Kerikeri).

Vessels

1. Coastguard New Zealand is a volunteer-based charity comprising 58 (at the time of the accident) units serving communities around the country. Coastguard New Zealand operate 107 vessels, the size and type of which varies between locations, but the average size is between 9 and 10 metres in length.
2. The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) maintains one vessel on 24-hour standby, which can be deployed within 12 hours of notification.
3. NZ Police are equipped with two purpose-built response vessels, to aid in a variety of police work including search and rescue operations and NZ Police diver support. The vessels are crewed by police specially trained in maritime operations, are located in Auckland and Wellington and can be deployed on 24 hour’s notice.

RCC asset database

1. The RCC maintains a countrywide database of all assets and their capabilities, which they use to make efficient decisions when tasking assets to SAR operations throughout the region.

Introduction

1. The Enchanter’s hull was well-constructed and in an apparent good state of repair. There is no evidence of any mechanical or equipment failure that could have contributed to the accident.
2. Although earlier on the day of the accident the sea conditions in the area had been adverse, the skipper had planned to seek shelter when required and judged the timing of the return trip to North Cape to coincide with the forecast and observed easing of the wind and sea conditions. The general sea conditions in the area off North Cape at the time of the accident should normally have been well within the capabilities of the vessel.
3. The Enchanter was knocked down by a wave, resulting in the destruction of its main cabin and flybridge, and total capsize. The accident was initially survived by nine of the ten people on board, yet five people tragically died.
4. The following section analyses the circumstances surrounding the accident to identify those factors that increased the likelihood of the event occurring. It also discusses factors that increased the severity of the outcome, such as the suitability and performance of survival equipment and the efficiency of the subsequent search and rescue response.
5. Other non-contributory safety issues that have the potential to adversely affect future operations are also discussed.

What happened

1. By the time the Enchanter was approaching North Cape the sea conditions there had moderated with the passing of a cold front over the area from the north. The wind had eased and backed towards the north. The sea conditions had eased to an estimated 1.5 to 2.0 metre waves.
2. Almost three hours before the accident the sky had cleared, and sea conditions had eased sufficiently for the skipper to allow passengers to move around and open the side windows in the main cabin. The lures were also deployed around this time.
3. The Enchanter was on automatic pilot for the trip to North Cape. The skipper was navigating from the flybridge, where the only helm and control console were located. The skipper was using a chart plotter to navigate. The chart plotter ran a ‘Time Zero’ (‘Time Zero’ is a manufacturer of navigation software) charting software program. In addition, the standalone radar and depth sounder were running. The skipper told the Commission there was a planned route displayed on the chart plotter from their departure point at the Princes Islands to the intended anchorage behind Murimotu Island via a series of waypoints, that, if followed, would have taken the Enchanter around Murimotu Island in deep water. The skipper described one of these waypoints (the ‘turn waypoint’) as being about 1.4 nautical miles off Murimotu Island (about 0.8 nautical miles outside the 10 metre depth contour), where the skipper intended to begin taking the Enchanter south. (See Figure 11 for a screenshot representing the skipper’s planned track, taken from another company-owned vessel.) The skipper said they were adjusting the autopilot to broadly follow this track. If the track was followed, they would have kept the vessel in about 50 metres water depth as the Enchanter closed with the coastline and reached the turn waypoint (as the GPS was not recovered, its exact coordinates are not known. The location of the planned waypoint was derived from the skipper’s description on the chart during interview). The skipper was aware that it was risky to pass too close to the coastline when sea conditions were adverse, particularly when the waves were from the northeast quarter.
4. In their interview, the skipper indicated that before reaching the turn waypoint, they had begun adjusting the autopilot to change course to ”head down” (indicating to head south). The skipper later clarified that only one adjustment had been made on the autopilot to the south and that was to bring the Enchanter back on track to the turn waypoint. The skipper said that it was not their intention to begin altering course to round Murimotu Island until after the Enchanter had reached the turn waypoint. The skipper placed the location of the capsize at a point north-northeast of Murimotu Island, where the Enchanter was still on its planned route and before it reached the turn waypoint.

1. In the period leading up to the capsize, the skipper had briefly walked to the rear of the flybridge to check on the trawls and then returned to the helm where the chart plotter was located. The skipper was seated there for an undetermined period. It was while seated there that the skipper noticed, in the fading light, the “wall of water” about to meet with the vessel from the port side. The time of the accident was approximately 1950, which was when the first mate had just looked at a mobile phone to view a text message.
2. The Commission was not able to establish an accurate track for the Enchanter leading up to the accident. The main GPS and chart plotter were in the separated flybridge structure, which was not recovered. The Globalstar spot-tracking device that had been installed by the owner had a habit of dropping offline. It did not transmit position reports for most of the trip from the Princes Islands to North Cape, except for five occasions, the last two of which were at 1806 and 1906 (about 43 minutes before the accident).
3. The second GPS unit retrieved from the skipper’s cabin during the salvage of the hull revealed no location data.
4. The skipper advised the Commission that the accident happened north-northeast of the awash rock near Murimotu Island in about 50 metres depth of water. This was based on the skipper’s perception of where the vessel was, the observations of water depth using the echosounder, that they could see the gap between the mainland and Murimotu Island before and after the capsize, and the estimated time of arrival at the anchorage.
5. The Commission has reached a different conclusion from the skipper as to the location of the accident. The Commission bases its view on an analysis of the EPIRB data, and drift modelling conducted by the RCC (refer to paragraphs 3.23 and 3.24).
6. The Commission acknowledges that the skipper and first mate recall seeing the gap between Murimotu island and the mainland both before and after the accident. These recollections could give a broad indication of orientation; however, they do not give an indication of distance from the land. The profile of the gap between the island and mainland (the outline in the fading light) would be visible across a broad area including the Commission’s calculated area of capsize (see Figure 12), but that profile would alter when viewed from different locations as the flybridge drifted north.

The EPIRB data

1. The Commission engaged an expert in EPIRB data analysis and functionality to explain the various forms of location data that the Enchanter’s EPIRB transmitted. See Appendix 5 for the expert report containing a detailed description of the EPIRB data.
2. The location data received at the RCC from the EPIRB was a combination of three data sources: firstly, medium-altitude earth orbiting search and rescue (MEOSAR) satellite data; secondly, the encoded Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) location data from the internal GPS; and thirdly, location data from an internal AIS, all transmitted directly from the EPIRB. The MEOSAR data is based on satellites receiving the generic 406/121.5-megahertz signal transmitted by the EPIRB. This signal will provide an initial alert to an EPIRB activation followed by an initial location, but its accuracy is limited. The accuracy of the MEOSAR location improves with time and the number of satellites passing overhead. For GPS-enabled EPIRBs (such as the one installed on the Enchanter) an internal GPS provides an encoded position that is transmitted to the satellite, providing RCC with an accurate location of the EPIRB to within an area of certainty of plus or minus two seconds of latitude and longitude. This means the GNSS coordinates provided identify a central position within a rectangle measuring 123 metres north to south, and 102 metres east to west. The EPIRB can be located anywhere within the rectangle at the time of transmission. This area of certainty is demonstrated in Figure 12 where each encoded position is centred within a green rectangle. Approximately 30 minutes after capsize, the first encoded GNSS GPS position transmitted by the EPIRB placed the Enchanter’s flybridge within 620 metres (inclusive of the area of certainty) of Murimotu Island at position S34 24.864’, E173 03.534’. The estimated area of capsize provided by the skipper was approximately 0.91-1.0 nautical miles east-northeast of this position (see Figure 12).
3. After the EPIRB had surfaced, the first mate made several attempts to manually activate the EPIRB in the dark, before successfully activating it between 2015 and 2016 (time of activation is based on data received by the RCC. According to the EPIRB manufacturer, an EPIRB is expected to transmit at approximately 50 seconds after activation). After it was activated, it was tied to the floating flybridge. The RCC received the first MEOSAR beacon alert at 2017 and the first transmission of the beacon’s encoded GPS position at 2020. In Figure 12 the green track shows the encoded positions of the EPIRB, and thus the location and drift direction of the flybridge, which the skipper, first mate and one passenger were sitting atop.
4. The accuracy of the encoded GPS positions transmitted by the EPIRB is also confirmed by comparing it with the TracPlus flight data (the TracPlus flight data is included in Appendix 6) from the first responding rescue helicopter. During the initial rescue of the three surviving passengers on top of the flybridge, the flight data shows the rescue helicopter hovering in close vicinity to the encoded position transmitted by the EPIRB at the same time.
5. Rescue helicopters are equipped with a homing device that helps locate an activated EPIRB in the event the position is not known. On the evening of 20 March 2022, the NEST rescue helicopter crew did not use their homing device. They flew to the flybridge using the encoded GPS position transmitted by the EPIRB, which was provided to them by RCC, and visually identified the EPIRB by its flashing strobe light. This demonstrates that the encoded GPS position transmitted by the EPIRB was accurate, as it led the helicopter directly to the scene.
6. The red dotted line in Figure 12 represents the skipper’s estimate of the Enchanter’s track and the red shaded area represents the area where the skipper estimated the accident occurred.
7. Figure 13 is an enlarged portion of Figure 12, showing the individual times and GPS positions for successive EPIRB encoded GNSS transmissions to the RCC. Figure 13 uses a chart from the Navionics charting software (navionics product-SonarChartTM collects sonar log data recorded from users operating in the area to keep charts updated), which shows depth contours in more detail.

Location of capsize

1. During the SAR operation the RCC was using drift-modelling software to help coordinate the search effort to the most likely area (The current data is obtained via an Environmental Data Server (based at the RPS group in Australia) that receives data from various sources globally. The data shown in this model was sourced from MetOceans Solutions and incorporates the MetOcean drift current forecasting with an underlying RPS tidal model. It is the most accurate hydrodynamic current model available for coastal New Zealand within the SARMAP system). The drift modelling calculated the net drift to be northward at the time and the location of the accident, mainly influenced by the tide. High water at North Cape occurred at 2234. With the pending change in tide, by 2130 (70 minutes after the EPIRB activation) the calculated drift pattern turned to become easterly (see Figure 14).
2. Objects in the water will drift in different directions depending on their characteristics. A lightweight object floating on the surface is more likely to be influenced by the wind and surface wave action, whereas objects floating deeper in the water will more likely be influenced by the tide and current. This phenomenon was observed during the SAR operation. The hull of the upturned vessel drifted more in a southerly direction. What is thought to have been a strobe light attached to a lifebuoy appeared to the survivors, relative to their own drift rate, to be drifting closer to the shoreline under the influence of the wind. The drift rate of the mostly submerged flybridge was accurately tracked by the EPIRB that was attached to it. The RCC drift modelling is consistent with the observed track of the EPIRB once it had been activated, which was initially northward and then turned east.
3. Using the encoded positions transmitted by the EPIRB, the initial drift of the flybridge was northward at about 0.14 knots. Taking into consideration the encoded positions area of certainty, as shown by the green rectangles in Figure 12, the EPIRB’s rate of drift was between about 0.06 to 0.17 knots.

1. When considering all the factors that could affect the drift of the flybridge, the Commission concluded it was about as likely as not that its rate and direction of drift after the EPIRB had been activated was similar to the 30 minutes prior to the EPIRB being activated (noting the EPIRB was attached to the flybridge). Therefore, it is about as likely as not that the location of the capsize would have been within an area about 0.07 nautical miles (about 130 metres) south of the first encoded position, as shown in Figure 12.
2. Both the first GNSS position transmitted by the EPIRB and this calculated area of capsize were within the 10 metre depth contour as shown in Figure 13.
3. These shallower water depths correlate more closely with the description of the wave that caused the Enchanter to capsize. This is discussed in more detail in the following section on weather and wave theory.
4. As stated previously, the skipper’s estimate of capsize location is approximately 0.91 to 1 nautical mile from where the EPIRB was activated. While this scenario was considered, the mostly submerged flybridge would need to have travelled that distance in 30 minutes, being driven by the current at an average rate of 1.8 to 2 knots in an opposing direction to the drift modelling provided by the RCC as well as the drift of the EPIRB post activation. The Commission considers this unlikely given the local conditions at the time of the accident.
5. The skipper’s estimated location of capsize is in a similar location to where the flybridge was located by the NEST rescue helicopter using the EPIRB’s encoded position, four hours later. For the skipper’s capsize location to be correct, there would have had to have either been little to no drift in the four-hour period between the capsize and rescue, or the direction of drift would have had to reverse after the EPIRB was activated, taking the flybridge back out to where the skipper estimated the capsize occurred. Neither hypothesis is consistent with the RCC drift modelling, which broadly correlated with the observed track of the EPIRB after it had been activated.
6. Weather systems can affect local conditions such as the direction and velocity of surface currents. The underwater topography can add a level of complexity to the various tides and currents if near shore. These factors add an element of uncertainty to any backdrift analysis. Reliable data sources recording such local conditions at North Cape do not exist. Therefore, to determine the approximate drift rate of the flybridge after EPIRB activation and the area of capsize, the Commission has used time and distance calculations based on the only reliable data available, the EPIRB transmissions, as these transmissions most accurately reflect the approximate drift rate of the flybridge after EPIRB activation.
7. Given the distance between the position of the EPIRB activation and the estimated capsize position provided by the skipper, the storm system would have needed to produce a current in excess of 2 knots opposing the predicted northern tidal flow, which is not supported by the initial drift pattern of the EPIRB.
8. The Commission has not been able to establish the reason for the disparity between where the skipper estimated the capsize happened in deep water, and where the encoded EPIRB data indicates the capsize occurred inshore in shallower water.

Weather and wave theory

1. The forecast for the sea area Brett (see Figure 6) for Sunday 20 March 2022 was for rough seas and a northeast swell rising to 2 metres ahead of a frontal weather system passing over the area from the North. The only actual recordings of the sea state in the general area were from two waverider buoys. One was a wave spotter buoy which had been drifting above North Cape from 17 to 24 March 2022. The other was a Northland Regional Council waverider buoy located off the Purerua Peninsular near the Bay of Islands, some 70 nautical miles southeast of North Cape and some 120 nautical miles southeast of the Three Kings Islands. The data from the Northland Regional Council waverider buoy is considered more representative of the general conditions off Murimotu Island as it was not affected by the weather pattern off the west coast of North Island.
2. On the day of the accident the wave spotter buoy had generally drifted in a westerly direction. At 1420 the buoy was located approximately 15 nautical miles northwest of Murimotu Island, recording a peak significant wave height of 4.2 metres with a period of about 8 seconds. By 1910 the buoy had drifted west to within 3 nautical miles of Cape Reinga recording significant wave heights of 3.2 metres, broadly demonstrating that conditions had started to ease during the Enchanter’s voyage to North Cape.
3. The Northland Regional Council waverider buoy recorded a peak in significant combined (wind and swell) wave height of about 4 metres with an average period of 7 seconds (the wave period created by this weather system, in deep water, is unlikely to change significantly over the 70 nautical miles between the waverider buoy and the accident area) between 1300 and 1400 on the day of the accident. The maximum recorded wave height for the same period was about 6 metres. These peaks coincide with the passing of the same frontal system that had passed over the Three Kings Islands earlier that morning. They also coincided with the time that the Enchanter departed the Three Kings Islands. By 2000 (about the time of the accident) the significant wave height off the Bay of Islands had fallen to 2.7 metres, with a maximum wave height of 4.3 metres. The wave height at North Cape had likely decreased more, being 70 nautical miles further northwest of the weather system.
4. Observers noted the presence of a smaller secondary swell coming from a southeast direction (head-on to the Enchanter’s direction). This secondary swell was considered much smaller than the main waves coming from the northeast sector. Waves from different directions can combine to form larger peaks and troughs.
5. Survivors from the Enchanter estimated the main wave heights were in the range of 1.5 to 2 metres (these observations are likely based on what they were seeing, rather than a significant wave height) off North Cape at the time of the accident. These estimates broadly correlate with the wave heights recorded off the Bay of Islands as the frontal system moved further south and the winds eased.
6. For a significant wave height of 2 metres in deep water, mariners can expect at least one in every 3,000 waves (or 3 every 24 hours) to reach 4 metres, twice the significant wave height (see Appendix 1 for more detail on wave formation and characteristics). In deep water a wave of this size should not pose a threat to a vessel of the Enchanter’s size, construction and stability.
7. The amount of energy a wave possesses is representative of its height and length. If a wave enters shallow water, its wavelength decreases with a consequential increase in height while maintaining the same energy. When waves reach water depths less than half of their wavelength, they interact with the seabed, causing them to slow, rise and steepen (referred to as peaking). The waves eventually break as the water depth decreases further to about 1/20th of its wavelength.
8. Therefore, waves with a longer wavelength will interact with the seabed earlier, than those with a shorter wavelength. Within a spectrum the waves will vary in height and length and thus energy. The average period of the waves recorded on the waverider buoy was about 7 seconds. For normal deep-water waves with a 7-second period their wavelength is calculated to be about 76 metres. Such waves would begin to interact with the seabed and start to peak at a depth of 38 metres. The shallower the water gets, the more they will peak until they begin to break at a water depth of about 4 metres.
9. Only one survivor saw the wave approaching and was able to give a detailed description of the wave that capsized the Enchanter. That survivor was a passenger sitting out on the aft fishing deck observing the trawling lures at the time. That passenger described seeing a ‘larger wave’ approaching from the port side from the same direction as the prevailing swell. This wave’s form did not initially cause concern, but then as the wave neared the vessel it appeared to rise into a near-vertical wall. This observation is consistent with a wave peaking as it enters shallow water.
10. The underwater topography off Murimotu Island matches the wave performance observed by the passenger. From seaward, the seabed off Murimotu Island slopes steeply from 50 to 10 metres water depth over 0.7 nautical miles (1300 metres). The seabed slopes very steeply from 30 to 2 metres water depth (see Figure 15). To the observer on the Enchanter’s aft deck a larger wave would have begun visibly peaking in the distance, with a sharp rise when the wave met with the 10-metre contour.
11. This analysis of the wave form supports the hypothesis founded on the EPIRB data, that the capsize occurred much closer inshore and in shallower water than estimated by the skipper.
12. Consideration was given by the Commission to whether the formation of what has been referred to as a ‘rogue wave’ was a factor in the capsize. In recent decades scientists have accepted the concept of rogue waves. The United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration refers to rogue waves as those that are large, unexpected and dangerous; are nominally greater than twice the significant wave height; are very unpredictable; and often come from directions other than the prevailing wind and waves (https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/roguewaves.html). Because these waves are uncommon, measurement and analysis of this phenomenon is rare (Appendix 1 contains further information relating to rogue waves).
13. As mentioned above, a wave within the spectrum of the significant wave height present off North Cape could, in less than 10 metre water depth, cause the capsize and damage that occurred to the Enchanter. So too would an even larger wave. Therefore, determining whether the wave that capsized the Enchanter was within or higher than the spectrum of significant wave height in the area is of little relevance because either could have caused the vessel to capsize in less than 10 metre water depth.
14. Regardless of where and how the vessel capsized, this accident raises significant safety issues about preparing for and increasing chances of surviving such an accident. We discuss these safety issues in the following sections.

Vessel stability and construction

1. When a vessel is knocked down by a wave and capsizes, its stability and construction are factors to consider. The Enchanter was resurveyed for restricted offshore limits in 2009. Then it underwent an inclining experiment and stability assessment to ensure it complied with the requirements of Maritime Rules Part 40C (Maritime Rules Part 40C – Design, Construction and Equipment – Non-passenger Ships that are not SOLAS Ships -Section 1, 13(1)). The Enchanter’s stability characteristics well exceeded the minimum requirements of Rules Part 40C. However, compliance with Rules Part 40C is no guarantee against a vessel capsizing. The Enchanter’s stability manual included the following warning to the master:

   Safety Information – Compliance with stability and freeboard criteria required under Maritime Rule[s] 40C does not ensure avoidance of capsizing regardless of the circumstances. It is the master’s responsibility to execute prudence and good seamanship with due regard to weather forecasts, navigation zone, speed, headings, load distribution and watertight integrity, so the vessel is operating in the safest mode possible against the prevailing conditions at all times.

2. The stability analysis process involved modelling the form of the hull’s watertight boundary and calculating certain criteria for comparison with those required under Rules Part 40C. The watertight boundary included the spaces below the Enchanter’s main deck and the raised foredeck (see Figure 16). It did not include the superstructure, comprising the main saloon, galley and flybridge.

1. The modelled boundary was not watertight in the true sense of the word. Inside the main saloon there were openings leading to the sleeping quarters under the foredeck, the engine room, and the crew’s accommodation aft, all of which would allow down-flooding to occur should water enter the main saloon or, as in this instance, if the entire superstructure was lost when the vessel was knocked down.
2. The naval architect conducting the stability analysis explained that the basis for considering the hull as watertight was that these openings would remain above the waterline when the vessel was heeled to its maximum angle before losing positive stability. The three main openings through which down-flooding could occur were all located around the centreline of the vessel and were calculated to be well above the waterline if the vessel were floating on its side (see Figure 17).
3. Statical stability is the ability of a vessel to return upright after removal of an external factor which caused the vessel to heel (in static or calm water). The Enchanter, when loaded as it typically would be nearing the end of a voyage, could heel over to an angle of about 77 degrees before it lost positive stability (often referred to as the point of vanishing stability). At this point the risk of capsize would be high, based on statical stability (if the vessel were very slowly pushed over to 77 degrees). However, a vessel’s ability to return upright when heeled by wind and/or waves at large angles of heel is not linear – it changes as the vessel progressively rolls. Therefore, a vessel’s dynamic stability is also assessed as part of the stability analysis. Dynamic stability in this context is the vessel’s overall resistance to being pushed over in response to waves and reaching that point of vanishing stability (see Appendix 2 for more detail on stability).
4. A vessel with low dynamic stability is easily rolled past the point where it loses stability. A vessel with high dynamic stability will take a lot more wave energy to reach that point. The Enchanter had relatively high dynamic stability, easily exceeding the minimum requirements of Rules Part 40C.

1. From the survivors’ accounts the Enchanter’s final roll to starboard was rapid. The wave that struck the vessel had sufficient energy to roll the vessel immediately on to its side with sufficient force to implode the windows and structure forming the main saloon. Wave energy of this magnitude is generated as much from the wave’s steepness and profile as its size.
2. The Enchanter’s superstructure appears to have offered little resistance to the capsizing energy of the wave. Within seconds the entire superstructure separated from the hull. This allowed water to down-flood into the ‘watertight’ hull through the internal openings, thus contributing to the total capsize.
3. The flybridge separated from what had been the supporting structure beneath it – the four bulkheads of the main saloon including all windows. The flybridge was discovered floating upside down close to the capsized hull. It was this structure that three of the survivors climbed onto, from which they were later rescued (see Figure 18).

1. Post-salvage inspection confirmed that the separation of the superstructure from the hull was not because of poor maintenance. The timber around this connection was in good condition and the method of connection was generally in accordance with the standards of wooden boat building for the era of build. The wooden material had failed from simple overload. Figure 19 shows the Enchanter after it had been salvaged. Note the total absence of the main superstructure (see Appendix 4 for details of the post-salvage inspection).

1. We now consider whether the outcome would have been different if the superstructure had been strong enough to withstand the initial knock down by the wave. If the superstructure had remained intact, it is about as likely as not that the vessel would not have capsized immediately. With the vessel floating on its side, part of the superstructure would have provided buoyancy and thus contributed to the dynamic stability of the vessel (see Figure 17). It is not possible to say definitively whether it would still have eventually capsized. That would depend on whether the vessel righted itself with successive waves and what openings there were in the superstructure to allow seawater to invade the saloon space – for example, open windows and the main rear door.
2. Nine of the ten people on board escaped to the water alive. It is likely that the person trapped in the forward sleeping quarters would have had a better chance of survival if the superstructure had remained intact. If the vessel had remained floating upright or on its side, the chance of survivors having access to the various life-saving aids would have been significantly improved. Three people who were known to have survived the initial capsize were later found deceased. Survivability was likely affected by swim failure. Having access to life jackets or a life raft would have reduced the onset of swim failure.
3. It would not be practicable to require superstructures on all vessels be able to withstand the vessel being knocked down by a wave. A vessel is built to a certain specification for a particular purpose. Its intended purpose will determine its design and what standards it must meet, if any. Some are built as recreational vessels, in which case their design is often specified by the owner. Some are built to a standard hull design, but the superstructure and fitout is varied at the owner’s request. Others (for example, a tug) are designed for a specific purpose.
4. Vessels often change ownership several times during their life and consequently their purpose often changes. Commercial vessels are required to be surveyed. If their purpose changes, they must undergo a survey to determine whether they are fit for their new intended purpose.
5. The variation in vessel design and purpose is therefore infinite. It would not be practicable to have one standard applicable to all vessels.
6. The Enchanter’s purpose changed several times over the life of the vessel. Each time it was resurveyed and deemed fit for that purpose. The Enchanter was originally built for a private owner to a standard Haag design and method of construction. It was initially designed as a motorsailer, then a Class IV launch, and ultimately was built as a Class X fishing vessel (these classifications refer to the standards applicable at that time). Two years later in 1984 it was modified to carry passengers. Nine years later in 1993 the Enchanter was lengthened by two metres. It changed ownership several times (exactly how many is undetermined). It was in commercial operation as a charter sport-fishing vessel when the current owner purchased the vessel in 2004. Under its current ownership it was resurveyed, enabling it to operate further offshore. The changes required to achieve these new limits – an upgrade to the equipment to be carried and a stability assessment – mainly related to how far from assistance it could be if an incident occurred.