

Inquiry 13-202: Bulk carrier, *IDAS Bulker*,
pilotage incident Napier, Hawke's Bay, 8 August 2013

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Final Report

Marine inquiry 13-202 : Bulk carrier, *IDAS Bulker*, pilotage
incident Napier, Hawke's Bay, 8 August 2013

Approved for publication: April 2014

Transport Accident Investigation Commission

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The Transport Accident Investigation Commission (Commission) is a standing Commission of inquiry and an independent Crown entity responsible for inquiring into maritime, aviation and rail accidents and incidents for New Zealand, and co-ordinating and co-operating with other accident investigation organisations overseas. The principal purpose of its inquiries is to determine the circumstances and causes of the occurrences with a view to avoiding similar occurrences in the future. Its purpose is not to ascribe blame to any person or agency or to pursue (or to assist an agency to pursue) criminal, civil or regulatory action against a person or agency. The Commission carries out its purpose by informing members of the transport sector and the public, both domestically and internationally, of the lessons that can be learnt from transport accidents and incidents.

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Important notes

Nature of the final report

This final report has not been prepared for the purpose of supporting any criminal, civil or regulatory action against any person or agency. The Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990 makes this final report inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings with the exception of a Coroner's inquest.

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Citations and referencing

Information derived from interviews during the Commission's inquiry into the occurrence is not cited in this final report. Documents that would normally be accessible to industry participants only and not discoverable under the Official Information Act 1980 have been referenced as footnotes only. Other documents referred to during the Commission's inquiry that are publicly available are cited.

Photographs, diagrams, pictures

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Photograph courtesy of Tony Des Landes

The IDAS Bulker entering Napier Harbour

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Abbreviations

°	degree(s)
'	minute(s) of a degree
Commission	Transport Accident Investigation Commission
IALA	International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities
STCW	International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended

Glossary

abeam	direction at right angles to the length of a vessel
Beaufort force	a scale that relates wind speed to observed conditions at sea or on land. Its full name is the Beaufort wind-force scale, although it is a range of wind speeds and not of "force" in the scientific sense of the word
chart datum	sea level used in connection with soundings on a chart. In British charts, it is a level below which the tide very rarely falls
knot(s)	nautical mile(s) per hour
north cardinal mark	cardinal marks indicate that the deepest water occurs on the side of the marks' name. They are placed to the north, south, east or west of hazards. Cardinal buoys have mainly the shape of columns or poles. They are painted in horizontal yellow and black stripes, and their top marks (2 cones) are painted black. The arrangement of cones at the top is an indication of the black stripe's (or stripes') position on the buoy
pilot	in relation to any ship means any person, not being the master or a member of the crew of the ship, who has the conduct of the ship
swept depth	depth of water below chart datum that has been established by using a wire sweep over the object of interest

Data summary

Vehicle particulars

Name:	<i>IDAS Bulker</i>
Type:	bulk carrier
Class:	Nippon Kaiji Kyokai
Limits:	SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea)
Classification:	NS* (Bulk Carrier)(ESP) MNS*
Length overall:	165.5 metres
Breadth:	27 metres
Gross tonnage:	16,418
Built:	1995, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Limited, Shimonoseki, Japan
Propulsion:	one direct-reversing, slow-speed B&W Mitsubishi 5L50MC diesel engine producing 5275 kilowatts. Driving a single fixed-blade propeller
Service speed:	13.5 knots
Owner:	K/S Danskib 34, Denmark
Operator:	Bidsted & Co, A/S, Denmark
Manager:	First Steamship S.A., Taiwan
Port of registry:	Panama
Minimum crew:	14

Date and time 8 August 2013 at about 21:45¹

Location Napier, Hawke's Bay

Persons involved vessel's crew and Napier pilot

Injuries nil

Damage nil

¹ Times in this report are in New Zealand Standard Time (co-ordinated universal time +12 hours) and are expressed in the 24-hour mode.

1. Executive summary

- 1.1. On 8 August 2013 the *IDAS Bulker* was departing Napier with a full cargo of logs. The vessel was initially under the control of a Napier pilot, who relinquished control of the vessel to the master approximately abeam South Pania Buoy (while still in the pilotage area) and departed the vessel.
- 1.2. The master of the *IDAS Bulker* was concerned that the course that the pilot had advised him to steer would bring the *IDAS Bulker* too close to another vessel that was inbound to the Napier pilot station.
- 1.3. The master and the navigating officer of the *IDAS Bulker*, after looking at the navigational chart, noted that the *IDAS Bulker* could safely pass to the south of North Pania Buoy, north of Pania Reef, and increase the passing distance between the 2 vessels.
- 1.4. The master ordered the course to be changed to pass south of the buoy. The pilot on the pilot vessel heading towards the inbound ship noticed that the *IDAS Bulker* had changed course and contacted the master. The pilot advised the master that he was heading into danger and to alter course so as to pass to the north of North Pania Buoy.
- 1.5. The master initially accepted and complied with the pilot's advice, but after re-checking the chart altered course back to the south and passed safely clear of the buoy and the inbound ship.
- 1.6. The investigation found that the master's actions were considered and did not place the *IDAS Bulker* in danger of grounding. However, the investigation found that the pilotage procedures for the Port of Napier were not in accordance with the regulations, and had not been for several years.
- 1.7. The Transport Accident Investigation Commission (Commission) made the following **findings**:
 - the course taken by the *IDAS Bulker* did not place the vessel in actual danger of grounding
 - when the pilot handed control of the navigation of the vessel back to the master, the master was placed in the position of navigating his vessel within a pilotage area in contravention of the Maritime Rules
 - the procedures used by Napier pilots as contained in Port of Napier Limited's Outward Pilotage procedures have not been aligned with the appropriate rules and legislation since 2003
 - no-one in Hawke's Bay Regional Council or the Port Authority and none of the pilots themselves realised that the procedures for outward pilotage were in error. The pilotage areas marked on the navigational charts and contained in nautical publications did not align with Maritime Rules and the Regional Council's Navigation Safety Bylaws.
- 1.8. The Commission made the following **recommendation**:
 - to the Chief Executive of Hawke's Bay Regional Council that the harbourmaster ensure that the Maritime Rules and Bylaws for piloting vessels within the Napier Pilotage Area are followed. Further, that the markings on and content in nautical publications such as, but not limited to, charts, Admiralty Sailing Directions and Admiralty Lists of Radio Signals are accurate in describing the areas and procedures for pilotage within Hawke's Bay Regional Council's areas of responsibility.

1.9. The **key lesson** learnt from the inquiry into this occurrence was:

- organisations need to ensure that they have compliance monitoring systems that detect changing regulatory requirements and that their policies and practices remain consistent with these.

2. Conduct of the inquiry

- 2.1. On 9 August 2013 at about 0800, the Commission was notified that an incident involving a bulk carrier, the *IDAS Bulker*, had occurred at about 22:00 on 8 August 2013.
- 2.2. The Commission opened an inquiry into the occurrence under section 13(1) of the Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990 and appointed an investigator in charge. The Chief Investigator of Accidents stood aside from this inquiry due to a possible perceived conflict of interest.
- 2.3. On 9 August 2 investigators travelled to Auckland, the *IDAS Bulker's* next port of call. On 10 August the investigators conducted interviews with the crew of the vessel with the help of an interpreter and collected evidence, including a download of the voyage data recorder from the vessel.
- 2.4. Two investigators travelled to Napier on 19 August to interview staff from Port of Napier and gather further evidence. On 20 August the investigators interviewed the Hawke's Bay Regional Council harbourmaster.
- 2.5. Extra information was sourced from Maritime New Zealand, Land Information New Zealand, Hawke's Bay Regional Council, Port of Napier and Automatic Identification System data.
- 2.6. On 16 December 2013 the Commission approved the draft final report to be circulated to interested persons for comment. The draft report was distributed on 23 January 2014 with the submissions requested by 28 February 2014.
- 2.7. By the closing date for receiving submissions the Commission had received two submissions that included comments that resulted in changes to the final report and six submissions detailing no comment on the report.
- 2.8. The Commission has considered all the submissions, and any changes as a result of those submissions have been included in this final report.
- 2.9. The report was approved for publication by the Commission on 15 April 2014.




Figure 1
Chart of the general area

3. Factual information

3.1. Narrative

- 3.1.1. On Wednesday 7 August 2013 the bulk carrier *IDAS Bulker* arrived in Napier from Nelson. At about 11:36 the vessel was secured alongside No.1E Berth to load logs for China.
- 3.1.2. The loading of about 8,800 tonnes of logs was completed at about 14:30 on 8 August, after which the crew were engaged in lashing the deck cargo. Cargo lashing was completed at about 21:00, the same time that the pilot arrived on board.
- 3.1.3. At about 21:15 the master of the *IDAS Bulker* told the pilot that the vessel was ready to leave. The pilot explained his outward passage plan (see Appendix 1) to the master, adding that there was a vessel inbound to the No.2 pilot station (see Figure 1) that the pilot was going to join after he departed from the *IDAS Bulker*.
- 3.1.4. By about 21:18 the *IDAS Bulker* had 2 tugs fast and was then let go from the wharf. The pilot manoeuvred the vessel off the wharf using the tugs and main engine. He ordered the 2 tugs let go as the vessel passed the entrance to the port (see Figure 2).
- 3.1.5. As the vessel passed between “A” and “B” buoys (see Figure 2) at the entrance to the dredged channel, the pilot manoeuvred the vessel to a course of 035 degrees (°). He briefed the master to remain on a course of 035° and leave North Pania Buoy to starboard. He then pointed out visually, on the radar and on the passage plan chart, the position of North Pania Buoy, South Pania Buoy and Yacht Buoy and the position of Pania Reef (see Figure 2).
- 3.1.6. As the *IDAS Bulker* was passing abeam of South Pania Buoy the pilot left the vessel (see Figure 2) and boarded the *Pania*, the pilot vessel. The master then took control of the navigation of the *IDAS Bulker* on the 035° course. The master summoned the navigator (second officer) to the navigating bridge to check the pilot’s designated route as it was not the route that the navigator and master had planned earlier.
- 3.1.7. The master of the *IDAS Bulker* contacted the vessel that was inbound to the pilot station by very-high-frequency radio channel 12 and agreed that the *IDAS Bulker* would pass North Pania Buoy to starboard and pass port-side to port-side with the inbound vessel. The master of the inbound vessel, a tanker, requested the master of the *IDAS Bulker* to keep clear of him and also stated that he was altering his course to starboard to 345°.
- 3.1.8. When the second officer of the *IDAS Bulker* arrived on the navigating bridge, he checked the new courses as advised by the pilot. While he was doing so he noted that there was a stretch of clear water with sufficient depth for the *IDAS Bulker* to the south of North Pania Buoy. The second officer brought this to the attention of the master. The master decided to take his vessel through this area as it would give him greater clearance from the inbound vessel. The master ordered the helmsman to apply 20° starboard helm.
- 3.1.9. At this time the *Pania* was astern of and on the port side of the *IDAS Bulker*. The pilot on board the *Pania* noticed both visually and on his multifunction navigation screen that the *IDAS Bulker* was turning to starboard. The pilot then called the *IDAS Bulker* on very-high-frequency radio channel 12 and advised him to alter course hard to port and come back to a heading of 035° (see Figure 2).
- 3.1.10. The master replied to the pilot and immediately instigated a hard-to-port manoeuvre as he believed he was heading into danger. After initiating the manoeuvre the master and second officer studied the chart and decided that the vessel was in safe water and that his intended course was still acceptable. The master then ordered 20 degrees starboard helm to bring the vessel back on a track to pass south of North Pania Buoy (see Figure 2). The pilot called the *IDAS Bulker* again to advise the master to turn back to port; the master replied that he was too close to North Pania Buoy to comply and continued through the clear water to the south of the buoy.




Figure 2
Track of the IDAS Bulker

3.2. Vessel information

- 3.2.1. The *IDAS Bulker* was a bulk carrier built in Japan in 1995, owned by K/S Danskib 34 of Denmark, and operated by Bidsted & Co, A/S also of Denmark. The vessel was registered in Panama and had valid certificates issued by Nippon Kaiji Kyokai on behalf of the Panamanian Government.
- 3.2.2. The *IDAS Bulker* had an overall length of 165.5 metres and a breadth of 27 metres. It had a timber summer draught of 9.848 metres. At the time of the incident the mean draught was 9.82 metres and the vessel was carrying about 27,650 tonnes of logs. The vessel sailed with a maximum draught of 10.32 metres.
- 3.2.3. The *IDAS Bulker* was powered by a single B&W Mitsubishi 6UEC52LA direct-reversing diesel engine developing 7170 brake-horsepower (5275 kilowatts), driving a single fixed-pitch propeller, giving a loaded service speed of about 13.5 knots. It had a semi-balanced rudder fitted directly behind the propeller. The vessel was not fitted with a bow thruster.
- 3.2.4. The *IDAS Bulker* was fitted with a navigational equipment suite that was typical of and met the requirements for the type of vessel.
- 3.2.5. The *IDAS Bulker* was equipped with a simplified voyage data recorder, which is a device that collects data from various sensors on board a vessel. The system digitises and stores the information in a protective, tamper-proof storage unit. The stored data in the unit is volatile, which means it is overwritten by new data after a period of time. The data can, however, be manually saved to the equipment's non-volatile memory then later downloaded for analysis.
- 3.2.6. During the morning of 9 August 2013, as instructed by the Commission, the master of the *IDAS Bulker* saved the data on his voyage data recorder. This data was later downloaded by the Commission investigators. The data was uncorrupted; however, only the data from 2200 on 8 August had been saved. This was nearly after the incident had played out and the *IDAS Bulker* was passing North Pania Buoy.

3.3. Personnel information

- 3.3.1. The master of the *IDAS Bulker* was a Chinese national and held a Panamanian master's certificate of competency issued on 31 January 2013 under the provisions of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended (STCW). He had joined the *IDAS Bulker* on 11 September 2012 as master.
- 3.3.2. The second officer of the *IDAS Bulker* was a Chinese national and held a valid Panamanian second officer's certificate of competency issued under the provisions of STCW. He had joined the *IDAS Bulker* on 15 May 2012 as second officer.
- 3.3.3. The third officer of the *IDAS Bulker* was a Chinese national and held a valid Panamanian class II/I certificate of competency as a deck officer issued under the provisions of STCW. He had joined the *IDAS Bulker* on 15 May 2012 as third officer.
- 3.3.4. The Port of Napier pilot was a New Zealand national and held a New Zealand master's certificate of competency issued under the provisions of STCW. He had been employed by Port of Napier since June 2012 and at the time of the incident was a class "C" pilot; this allowed him to pilot vessels up to 185 metres in length.

4. Analysis

4.1. General

- 4.1.1. The pilot perceived that the master of the *IDAS Bulker* was endangering his vessel by navigating towards a known navigational danger (Pania Reef). However, this was not the case as the master had mitigated the risk, as discussed below.
- 4.1.2. The reported incident arose after the pilot had left the *IDAS Bulker*, which led the Commission to scrutinise the pilotage and operational practices and procedures at Port of Napier.
- 4.1.3. The weather at the time of the incident was reported to be a northerly wind, Beaufort force 4 (11-16 knots) with a slight sea and swell. The visibility was good with broken cloud cover; however, as it was just after new moon there would have been little natural light. The weather did not contribute to the incident.
- 4.1.4. The following analysis discusses what caused the *IDAS Bulker* to be navigated to the south of a north cardinal buoy and the robustness of the safety system for the port, particularly regarding navigational risk and the need to carry a licensed pilot.

4.2. Navigation and buoyage

- 4.2.1. The master of the *IDAS Bulker* was concerned that the predicted closest point of approach of the inbound vessel to his vessel was less than he was comfortable with, so he called the other vessel to agree on passing arrangements, as the pilot had suggested he should. The master and second officer then determined that a greater separation could be achieved by taking the *IDAS Bulker* south of North Pania Buoy. The master then opted to take that route, where there was sufficiently deep water.
- 4.2.2. Although the *IDAS Bulker* was heavily laden, to within 30 millimetres of its maximum draught, and was slow to manoeuvre, there was sufficient water depth for the vessel to navigate safely on the intended course to the south of North Pania Buoy. The master mitigated the risk further by instigating a more frequent position-fixing regime of every 2 or 3 minutes, as was seen on the vessel's navigational charts that were in use.
- 4.2.3. When the pilot called the master to advise him to turn hard to port, the master instinctively obeyed and brought the vessel back to port until he checked again that he had a sufficient depth of water. The vessel, as far as both the master and the pilot were concerned, was not under the control of the pilot. The pilot was advising the master as a "concerned seafarer" that he was heading into danger.
- 4.2.4. Section 200 of the Maritime Transport Act 1994 states that Maritime New Zealand is the national authority responsible for:
 - the management of all navigational aids on or near the coasts of New Zealand and the adjacent seas except those a person (including a local authority) who operates a port must provide for that facility (an operator) and is responsible for them (Government of New Zealand, 1994).
- 4.2.5. Maritime New Zealand produced a publication, "New Zealand's system of buoys and beacons", which explained the buoyage and "beaconage" system in New Zealand waters and the recommended requirements for aids to navigation in harbours and their approach channels (Maritime New Zealand, 2008). This publication stated that the waters of New Zealand and adjacent islands were marked for safe navigation using the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) System "A" Maritime Buoyage System.
- 4.2.6. North Pania Buoy was classified under IALA System "A" as a north cardinal mark and had the required distinctive flashing white light fitted. A north cardinal mark indicates that the deepest and safest water lies in the direction indicated, in this case to the north, and the marks should be passed to that side. However, it does not mean that the north cardinal mark cannot be safely passed to the south by vessels that have sufficiently shallow draughts.

- 4.2.7. North Pania Buoy had been moved to its present position from a position closer to the reef some time prior to 2001. The Port of Napier could not provide any documentation that explained the reasons for the buoy being moved, but advised the Commission verbally that the move was to put an isolated rock with a swept depth of 13.7 metres below chart datum to the south of the buoy, as the rock could be considered a hazard to vessels close to or at the 12-metre maximum draught for containerships visiting the port.
- 4.2.8. Hawke's Bay Regional Council and Port of Napier submitted that the master had endangered his vessel by going south of North Pania Buoy. They were correct in noting that it would ordinarily be prudent to pass north of North Pania Buoy. However, because the pilot was not on board and had not arranged remote piloting, the master exercised his best judgement and decided that he could safely pass the buoy on the "wrong side". Furthermore, he mitigated the risk of navigating closer to Pania Reef by confirming his assessment with the second officer and fixing the position of the vessel more frequently.

Findings

- 1 The master of the *IDAS Bulker* was concerned that the inbound vessel's predicted closest point of approach to his vessel was too close.
- 2 The master of the *IDAS Bulker*, after evaluating the risks, decided to take his vessel south of North Pania Buoy so as to increase the distance between his vessel and the inbound vessel.
- 3 The master mitigated the additional risk of taking the vessel closer to the reef by confirming with the second officer the depth of water available and fixing the position of the vessel more frequently.

4.3. Legislation

- 4.3.1. The reported incident occurred when the vessel was within a compulsory pilotage area but without a pilot on board. In New Zealand the statutory provisions relating to pilots are contained in several Acts and Rules. The Local Government Act 1974 makes regional authorities responsible for determining requirements for compulsory pilotage.
- 4.3.2. Maritime Rules Part 90, Pilotage, was issued under the terms of the Maritime Transport Act 1994, and had been amended several times since the original Part came into force in 1999. The original Part was amended in its entirety in 2003 and further amended twice in 2010. The relevant parts of the Part in force on the date of the incident are contained in Appendix 2.
- 4.3.3. The original Maritime Rules Part 90, which commenced in 1999, stated that:

A master of a ship that proceeds in a pilotage district, other than in any waters where bylaws provide that pilotage is not compulsory, must ensure that a pilot who has been appointed or licensed to act in that district is carried on board the ship.

- 4.3.4. Pilotage "districts" became pilotage "areas" in Maritime Rules Part 90 when the rule was revised in 2003. The area for Napier specified in the schedule to the rule was:

The area comprising all port waters between latitudes 39°25'S and 39°29'S, to the west of longitude 176°59'E. (Port limits: the seaward limit of the port is the arc of a circle radius 3 ½ miles centred on East Pier Light (39°28'.7S, 176°53'.7E))

This pilotage area is the same as that shown in the Hawke's Bay Regional Council Navigation Safety Bylaws (see Appendix 4). In the 2010 amendment to Maritime Rules Part 90 the vessel size limits were changed to: "500 gross tonnage or 40 metres length overall".




Figure 3
Extent of pilotage areas

4.4. Use of a pilot

Safety issue – The IDAS Bulker was not under the control of a licensed pilot when navigating within a pilotage area, contrary to the requirements of the Maritime Rules and the Hawke's Bay Regional Council Navigation Safety Bylaws.

4.4.1. The Nautical Institute's publication on pilotage and ship-handling states that:

A vessel's master is charged with the responsibility for the safety of the vessel and the efficient prosecution of the voyage. Pilots are engaged to assist with navigation in confined waters and to facilitate port approach, berthing, unberthing and departure. The vessel's master carries the ultimate responsibility and has the right to take over from the pilot in cases, albeit rare, where inexperience or misjudgement [of the pilot] can hazard a vessel (Nautical Institute, 1990).

4.4.2. The Commission was unable to source a copy of the relevant regional bylaws in force in 1999, so it could not determine whether pilotage had previously not been compulsory in a part of the Napier Pilotage Area for an outbound vessel. However, this would have been unlikely as it would have allowed piloted and non-piloted vessels within the same area. The requirement to carry a pilot while in a pilotage area for vessels that met or exceeded the limits set in the Rule (at 40 metres or over for Napier at the time) was introduced in the 2003 amendment to Maritime Rules Part 90: Pilotage.

4.4.3. The practice of Port of Napier pilots was to board incoming vessels in the vicinity of either of the designated pilot stations (see Figure 3) and take control of the navigation of the vessels into the port. When a vessel departed the port a pilot would board the vessel at the berth and take control of the navigation until it was approximately abeam South Pania Buoy. The pilot would then show the master the appropriate course for the vessel to follow and the position of the navigation buoys, before handing control of the navigation back to the master and departing the vessel. The pilots did not suggest to masters, or believe themselves, that they retained control of outward vessels while they remained in the pilotage area.

4.4.4. The appropriate authority, in this case Hawke's Bay Regional Council, had deemed that a pilot was required to be in control of the navigation of the vessel within the pilotage area. Since 2003 the procedures used by Napier pilots and contained in Port of Napier's Outward Pilotage procedures (see Appendix 3) have contravened the Maritime Rules. By handing control of the navigation to the master and leaving the vessel, the pilot placed the master in the position of navigating his vessel within a pilotage area in contravention of the Maritime Rules. Therefore the practice of pilots leaving vessels before reaching the published pilotage limit was in breach of the Maritime Rules.

4.4.5. Had the pilot remained on board until the vessel was clear of the pilotage area, or at least until the vessel was clear of North Pania Buoy, the pilot's knowledge of the area and familiarity with manoeuvring vessels in close proximity to each other might have assured the master that he could maintain the originally agreed passage plan.

Findings:

- 4 The pilot handed control of the navigation of the *IDAS Bulker* to the master while the vessel was still in the compulsory pilotage area, and without an arrangement for remote pilotage.
- 5 When the pilot handed control of the navigation of the vessel back to the master, the master was placed in the position of navigating his vessel within a pilotage area in contravention of the Maritime Rules.
- 6 The procedures used by Napier pilots as contained in Port of Napier's Outward Pilotage procedures had not been aligned with the appropriate rules and legislation since 2003.

4.5. Pilotage areas

Safety issue – Napier pilots were unaware of the requirement to provide a pilotage service throughout the whole of the Napier Pilotage Area and that the outward pilotage limit was not legal.

- 4.5.1. It could not be determined when the practice began of the outward pilots leaving vessels approximately abeam of South Pania Buoy. From interviews with the pilots it appeared that the practice was in place prior to 2002.
- 4.5.2. The 2001, 2004 and 2007 Sailing Directions for New Zealand (New Zealand Pilot book), produced by the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office², noted that the pilot “usually disembarks the vessel at the seaward end of the dredged entrance channel”. The 2010 edition of the Sailing Directions noted that the pilot usually departed “seaward of the outward pilotage limit”.
- 4.5.3. An email dated 7 December 2005 from the Hawke’s Bay Regional Council harbourmaster³ to Land Information New Zealand (see Appendix 5) stated that the definition of the outward limit was saved from “The present HBRC [Hawke’s Bay Regional Council] Navigation Safety Bylaws 2002” and this defined an “inward” pilotage limit that was smaller than that shown on the official navigational chart of the area and defined the outward limit. The only part of this change reflected in subsequent navigational charts was the insertion of the outward pilotage limit.
- 4.5.4. Port of Napier submitted that its pilotage procedures and practices were no different from those of a number of other ports in New Zealand, and the Commission agreed. However, a difference occurred in that no other port in New Zealand had an outward pilotage area that was different from the inward pilotage area. All other ports in New Zealand had pilotage areas as described in the Maritime Rules.
- 4.5.5. The harbourmaster noted in the email that “Pilotage of outward vessels between ‘B’ Buoy (position Lat 39° 27.935[S?] Long 176° 54.86E) and the ‘outward’ limits may be conducted by VHF [very-high-frequency radio] from the pilot boat provided such procedure is incorporated in the ‘Passage Plan’ and has been agreed by the Master of the vessel” (see Figure 3). Although this statement set out correctly the procedure to be followed, albeit for the short distance mentioned and not to the extent of the full pilotage area, this procedure was not followed through into the pilot procedures of Port of Napier, or Port of Napier’s outward passage plans. Further, according to Maritime Rules Part 90: Pilotage, that exception was confined to circumstances when a transfer of the pilot would be unsafe.
- 4.5.6. It is difficult to comprehend that no-one in the Regional Council or the Port Authority and none of the pilots themselves had noticed the errors in Port of Napier’s procedures for outward pilotage, which were described in nautical publications and in the pilotage areas marked on the navigational charts. The pilotage areas and procedures did not align with the Maritime Rules or the Regional Council’s Navigation Safety Bylaws. Two opportunities to identify and correct the errors were missed: the first when the Bylaws were amended in 2007, and the second when the harbourmaster reviewed the Bylaws in 2012.

² Often referred to as “Pilots”, Sailing Directions provide essential information on all aspects of navigation for use by the merchant mariner on all classes of ocean-going vessel. Sailing Directions complement Admiralty Standard Nautical Charts and provide worldwide coverage in 74 volumes. The Sailing Directions produced by the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office are considered one of the foremost publications of this type in the world and are used on ocean-going vessels worldwide.

³ References to the Hawke’s Bay Regional Council harbourmaster are to the incumbents during the periods indicated.

Findings:

- 7 When Maritime Rules Part 90 was revised in 2003, the pilotage areas then in force were included. The Napier Pilotage Area defined in both the Maritime Rules and the Hawke's Bay Regional Council Navigation Safety Bylaws in 2003 has remained the same until the present day.
- 8 No-one in the Regional Council or the Port Authority and none of the pilots themselves realised that the procedures for outward pilotage were in error. The pilotage areas marked on the navigational charts and contained in nautical publications did not align with the Maritime Rules and the Regional Council's Navigation Safety Bylaws.

5. Findings

- 5.1. The master of the *IDAS Bulker* was concerned that the inbound vessel's predicted closest point of approach to his vessel was too close.
- 5.2. The master of the *IDAS Bulker*, after evaluating the risks, decided to take his vessel south of North Pania Buoy so as to increase the distance between his vessel and the inbound vessel.
- 5.3. The master mitigated the additional risk of taking the vessel closer to the reef by confirming with the second officer the depth of water available and fixing the position of the vessel more frequently.
- 5.4. The pilot handed control of the navigation of the *IDAS Bulker* to the master while the vessel was still in the compulsory pilotage area, and without an arrangement for remote pilotage.
- 5.5. When the pilot handed control of the navigation of the vessel back to the master, the master was placed in the position of navigating his vessel within a pilotage area in contravention of the Maritime Rules.
- 5.6. The procedures used by Napier pilots as contained in Port of Napier's Outward Pilotage procedures have not been aligned with the appropriate rules and legislation since 2003.
- 5.7. When Maritime Rules Part 90 was revised in 2003, the pilotage areas then in force were included in the Part. The Napier Pilotage Area defined in both the Maritime Rules and the Hawke's Bay Regional Council Navigation Safety Bylaws in 2003 has remained the same until the present day.
- 5.8. No-one in the Regional Council or the Port Authority and none of the pilots themselves realised that the procedures for outward pilotage were in error. The pilotage areas marked on the navigational charts and contained in nautical publications did not align with the Maritime Rules and the Regional Council's Navigation Safety Bylaws.

6. Safety actions

General

6.1. The Commission classifies safety actions by 2 types:

- (a) safety actions taken by the regulator or an operator to address safety issues identified by the Commission during an inquiry that would otherwise result in the Commission issuing a recommendation
- (b) safety actions taken by the regulator or an operator to address other safety issues that would not normally result in the Commission issuing a recommendation.

Safety actions addressing safety issues identified during an inquiry

6.2. On 27 February 2014 Port of Napier advised that following its receipt of the draft report, it had:

- promptly changed its operating procedures and practices to comply with Rule 90.23. All pilots (and other relevant staff) have been made aware of the requirements of the Rule and the change in procedure and practice
- promptly requested the harbourmaster to ensure that Hawke's Bay Regional Council changed all relevant navigation charts to remove all references to inward/outward pilotage limits within the Napier Pilotage Area
- promptly amended its internal compliance annual audit procedures to include a provision to check for compliance with Rule 90.23 and to ensure that it is promptly made aware of all other changes to maritime laws that are relevant to the port company's operations and that it complies with those
- informed its external compliance auditors of this change (of whom one is Maritime New Zealand), and highlighted that the external audits of the port company's compliance with legislation carried out annually since 2003 had failed to identify the port company's non-compliance with Rule 90.23.

7. Recommendations

General

- 7.1. The Commission may issue, or give notice of, recommendations to any person or organisation that it considers the most appropriate to address the identified safety issues, depending on whether these safety issues are applicable to a single operator only or to the wider transport sector. In this case, recommendations have been issued to Hawkes Bay Regional Council and Port of Napier.
- 7.2. In the interests of transport safety it is important that these recommendations are implemented without delay to help prevent similar accidents or incidents occurring in the future.

Recommendations

Safety issue – Napier pilots were unaware of the requirement to provide a pilotage service throughout the whole of the Napier Pilotage Area and that the outward pilotage limit did not exist.

- 7.3. No-one in Hawke's Bay Regional Council or the Port Authority and none of the pilots themselves realised that the procedures for outward pilotage were in error. The pilotage areas marked on the navigational charts and contained in nautical publications did not align with the Maritime Rules and the Regional Council's Navigation Safety Bylaws.
- 7.3.1. On 15 April 2014 the Commission recommended to the Chief Executive of Hawke's Bay Regional Council that the harbourmaster ensure that the Maritime Rules and Bylaws for piloting vessels within the Napier Pilotage Area are followed. Further, that the markings on and content in nautical publications such as, but not limited to, charts, Admiralty Sailing Directions and Admiralty Lists of Radio Signals are accurate in describing the areas and procedures for pilotage within Hawke's Bay Regional Council's areas of responsibility. (007/14)

On 9 May 2014, Hawke's Bay Regional Council replied, in part:

On the 15 January 2014, the Harbourmaster and Napier Port Services Manager agreed to make the recommended changes to the Napier Port Outward Pilotage procedure. Napier Port Services Manager, Bruce Lohead, notified TAIC, by letter, of the changes on the 27 February 2014 and provided a copy of the new procedure.

LINZ was requested to make changes to chart NZ5612, Napier roads, on 26 February 2014. These changes related to the Commission's recommendations as well as changes to pilot boarding grounds and No: 2 anchorage. A Notice to Mariners 87/14 has been issued advising of these changes.

LINZ has also been requested to make further permanent changes to NZ5612, in regard to the Outward Pilotage Limit and Inward Pilotage Limit on the chart. A Notice to Mariners has not yet been issued advising of these changes.

Changes to Admiralty Sailing Directions and Admiralty Lists of Radio Signals are the domain of the publishers of those publications. The publishers obtain information from Notices to Mariners and publish updates accordingly.

8. Key lesson

- 8.1. Organisations need to ensure that they have compliance monitoring systems that detect changing regulatory requirements and that their policies and practices remain consistent with these.

9. Citations


Government of New Zealand. (1994). *Maritime Transport Act 1994*. Wellington: Government of New Zealand.


Maritime New Zealand. (2008). *New Zealand's system of buoys and beacons*. Wellington: Maritime New Zealand.

Nautical Institute. (1990). *The Nautical Institute on Pilotage and Shiphandling*. London: The Nautical Institute.

Appendix 1: Port of Napier Limited's outward passage plan for the *IDAS Bulker*

Ship:	IDAS Bulker
Date:	Thu, 8 Aug 2013 @ 21:00 Hour
Pilot:	2120 Depart.
Movement:	Departure
Draft Fore:	9.80 m
Draft Aft:	9.98 m
Wind	10.32
Present:	Forecast:
Speed:	5.99 5.00 kts
Direction:	278.33 W
Swell	
Direction:	98.30
Height:	0.38
Period:	11.80
Tide (Standard Time)	
Lowest at:	01:00 hr 0.31
Highest at:	18:14 hr 1.70
UKC Calculation (Fairway/Basin)	
Dredge Depth:	11.20 m
Tide:	+ 1.21 m
Total Depth:	= 12.41 m
Draft:	~ 9.98 m
Static UKC:	= 2.43
(no allowance for dynamic)	
Tug Position	
Master
Pilot
Pilot Plan Number 00008288	







IDAS Bulker

TW Monitor for HW - 09 Aug 2013 07:06 NZST, 1.523 m

Window Open	8 August 2013 20:28 hrs NZST	Window open now	
Window Close	10 August 2013 02:27 hrs NZST	Window open at end of prediction period.	
Select Sail	8 August 2013 21:00 hrs NZST		
Prediction Time: 08 Aug 2013 20:27 NZST (11 Hour Forecast)			
Transit	Vessel	Stability	Climate
Berth: 1 East Side To Berth: Starboard Direction: Export Channel: NP 035	Hull: Bulk Carrier Beam: 27.00 m LBP: 158.00 m Fore Draft: 9.80 m Mid Draft: 9.89 m Aft Draft: 9.98 m	Modelled Draft: 9.89 m Displacement: 34253 t KG: 10.22 m GMf: 0.73 m	Hs Sea: 0.14 m Tp Sea: 6.90 s Hs Swell: 0.67 m Tp Swell: 11.11 s Swell Dir: 96 deg HW Residual: -0.10 m
C Limit : 0.25m		MM Limit : 0.60m	
CAUTION: Result assumes zero swell growth from stated condition			
DUKC information is a guide only. Final values to be confirmed during Master / Pilot passage planning.			
Static UKC Rule :			

[Printed 19/08/2013 14:05 NZST]

Appendix 2: Relevant parts of Maritime Rules Part 90: Pilotage 2010

pilot, in relation to any ship, means any person, not being the master or a member of the crew of the ship, who has the conduct of the ship.

pilotage means the conduct of a ship by a pilot and **to pilot a ship** has a corresponding meaning.

90.23 Requirement to carry a pilot

- (1) Except as provided in subrules (3), (4) and (6), the master of an oil tanker, chemical tanker, or gas carrier must ensure that the ship, when navigating in any pilotage area either—
 - (a) carries a pilot who holds a current, appropriate pilot licence; or
 - (b) receives advice⁶ from a pilot ashore or aboard another vessel, who holds a current appropriate pilot licence, in circumstances where the master has been informed by the pilot that⁷—
 - (i) the pilot is unable to transfer to or from the ship safely; and
 - (ii) in the opinion of the pilot, the movement of the ship within the pilotage area can be completed safely, with the pilot's advice.
- (2) Except as provided in subrule (6) and rule 90.24, the master of any ship, other than an oil tanker, chemical tanker or gas carrier, that meets or exceeds any limits specified for a pilotage area must ensure that the ship, when navigating in that pilotage area, either—
 - (a) carries a pilot who holds a current, appropriate pilot licence; or
 - (b) receives advice from a pilot ashore or aboard another vessel, who holds a current appropriate pilot licence, in circumstances where the master has been informed by the pilot that⁸—
 - (i) the pilot is unable to transfer to or from the ship safely; and
 - (ii) in the opinion of the pilot, the movement of the ship within the pilotage area can be completed safely, with the pilot's advice.
- (3) No exemption from this rule may be granted to a person under section 47 of the Act in respect of an oil tanker, unless—
 - (a) the primary operational function of that tanker is ship-to-ship bunkering within a pilotage area; and
 - (b) that tanker is not capable of carrying more than 5,000 tonnes of oil in total (including cargo and its own fuel).
- (4) No exemption from this rule may be granted to a person under section 47 of the Act in respect of a chemical tanker, unless that tanker—
 - (a) operates only within the pilotage area; and
 - (b) is not capable of carrying more than 1,500 tonnes of cargo.
- (5) No exemption from this rule may be granted to a person under section 47 of the Act in respect of a gas carrier.
- (6) Subrules (1) and (2) do not apply where the ship is transiting between the perimeter of the pilotage area and a designated pilot boarding station or anchorage within that pilotage area⁹ with the prior approval of a pilot.

90.24 Dispensation from requirement to carry a pilot

Unless the master of a ship referred to in rule 90.23(2) is directed to carry a pilot by the harbourmaster or the Director under Section 60A(2) of the Act, that master is not required to ensure the ship carries a pilot when navigating in any pilotage area if—


- (a) the master holds a current, appropriate PEC and has the conduct of the ship; or
- (b) the master and the first mate both hold a current, appropriate PEC and the first mate has the conduct of the ship.

90.122 Activation of compulsory pilotage areas

The pilotage requirements prescribed in rules 90.23 and 90.24 will apply to—

- (a) all pilotage areas listed in Appendix 1 from 1 April 2011; and
- (b) the individual pilotage areas listed in Appendix 2, from dates that may be determined by the Director, where he or she considers the application of those pilotage requirements is necessary in the interests of maritime safety or marine protection.

Appendix 3: Port of Napier Limited's Outward Pilotage procedures

Controlled		Issue No: 11
Authorised: Port Services Manager	PILOTAGE OUTWARD PILOTAGE	30/05/13

PURPOSE

This procedure provides an overview of the pilot, floating plant and linesmen activities associated with the physical departure of a vessel. It starts after planning for the ship's departure ([Pilotage Procedures, Ship Pre Planning Proc 2](#)) has been completed.

PROCEDURE

- 1) Resources for the ship's departure are reviewed by the pilot including the use of a PPU and or a co-pilot. The pilot shall also check the weather, swell forecast and any DUKC requirements.
- 2) If the pilot considers the number of tugs planned for the departure needs to be altered, port control to be updated and the E Text/ answerphone procedure is to be activated. [Refer Pilotage Procedures, Texting and Answerphone Procedure 5.](#)
- 3) Floating plant start up procedures are outlined in the vessels safety manuals. Mooring procedures are outlined in the [Marine Operational Policies Manual Procedure 3 - Letting Ships Go On Shore Lines](#) and [Procedure 7 - Boarding Departing Log Ships](#).
- 4) Once onboard the Pilot/Master exchange is to be conducted. Pilot shall present the passage plan as per pilot procs form 2&3. Agreement is to be attained with the bridge team as to the intended plan, procedure for shoreline let go, disembarkation position, pilot ladder arrangements and handover procedure to bridge team shall also be discussed. The pilot shall review the vessels pilot card and any other relevant information pertaining to the vessel.
- 5) If the vessel is not ready for departure the marine crew should be placed on stand by, if the anticipated delay is less than 30 minutes. If the delay is longer than 30 minutes, orders should be updated. [Refer PPTP-PRO-04, Updating Shipping Orders.](#)
- 6) If the pilot considers a vessel deficiency could pose a risk to safe pilotage or there is disagreement between and pilot and bridge team, he must consult with Port Services Manager or Unrestricted Pilot and Harbourmaster before proceeding. If it is deemed that it is unsafe to continue with the pilotage then the pilot shall suspend the pilotage until the deficiency or issue has been rectified.
- 7) Pilot shall advise tugs of their intended position and give a briefing as to the intended Manoeuvre. When tugs are fast the pilot is to be advised.
- 8) When vessel secured with shorelines the pilot shall liaise with the mooring team to confirm the procedure for letting go lines and establish an appropriate method for disembarking hammermen.
Hammermen may disembark at the wharf whilst vessel is held alongside or by pilot vessel or in the swinging basin via the pilot ladder.
- 9) The pilot will ensure that the swinging basin and approach channel are clear. Pilot vessel may be used to clear small craft from the outbound channel.
Pilot may request standard distances off as specified in Standard 15 for Giving Distances Off. ([refer Marine Standing Order](#))

Controlled	NAPIER^o PORT	Issue No: 11
Authorised: Port Services Manager	PILOTAGE OUTWARD PILOTAGE	30/05/13

- 10) Single up then let go remaining lines. Ensure confirmation received from linesmen that all lines are clear fore and aft. Advice must be received that the Hammermen are safely off the ship. [Refer Marine Standing Order 14 - Transfer of Hammermen](#)
- 11) Release tugs lines when appropriate, receive confirmation from tugmaster(s) that lines have been released and are all clear, dismiss tugs at safe point. Oil tankers and laden chip vessels are to be escorted until clear of the fairway with towline attached where practical.
- 12) Where there is an inbound pilotage taking place concurrently. The outbound pilot shall contact the inbound pilot advising intended outward channel and the pilots shall ensure adequate clearing distances between the two vessels is maintained. Outbound pilot shall advise inbound pilot when tugs are available. Where practicable outbound pilot should change working channel for communication with Pania.
- 13) Communication shall be established with Launchmaster to advise departing channel, side of pilot ladder, number of persons to disembark and if PPU to be transferred. Prior to leaving bridge pilot shall check the conditions are suitable for disembarkation and ladder has been checked and satisfactory.
- 14) Handover to Master and bridge team should include but not be limited to: Vessels position, course and speed, expected traffic including likelihood of fishing, recreational craft and any other information relevant to disembarkation. When vessel is transitting outward channel on 035 course pilot to ensure proper course marked on chart and Pania Reef is highlighted. North Pania buoy should be sighted visibly and by radar.
- 15) If it is anticipated that the pilot cannot disembark safely, using the standard procedure, the pilot should look at the option of disembarking inside the port and guide the vessel out if deemed safe to do so, refer to boarding proc 6 para 8 covering remote pilotage. Should such option be deemed unsafe then pilot should be carried over to the vessels next port and advise all parties accordingly.
Pilot to ensure that the ship's deck officer has observed the disembarkation and is in Communication with bridge.
- 16) If there is an incident/accident or near miss then [Refer to Refer to Safety Procs\Pro 2: Marine Incident](#).


Appendix 4: Relevant parts of the Hawke's Bay Regional Council Navigation Safety Bylaws 2012

Pilot in relation to any ship means any person not being the master or a member of the crew of the ship who has the conduct of the ship

1.2 AREAS WITHIN WHICH THESE BYLAWS APPLY

These Bylaws apply to all waters within the Hawke's Bay Regional Council boundary as shown in Figure 1 except:

- Lake Waikaremoana
- Lake Waikareiti.



5.1 REVOCATION OF BYLAWS

- 5.1.1 The following bylaws and all amendments to those bylaws in Hawke's Bay Region, and made under Section 684B of the Local Government Act 1974 are revoked:
Hawke's Bay Regional Council Navigation & Safety Bylaws 2007

S1.4 NAPIER PILOTAGE AREA


The area comprising all port waters between latitudes 39°25'S and 39°29'S to W of longitude 176°59'E.

1.4.1 General directions for navigating in Napier Pilotage Area as shown in map 1.4:

- (a) The Master shall ensure that while within Napier Pilotage Area:
 - (i) automatic-steering “pilot” devices are not used, unless a helmsman is standing by in the immediate vicinity of the helm or wheel, otherwise the vessel is to be in the handsteering mode; and
 - (ii) main engines are immediately available for reducing speed, stopping or going astern at all times without delay; and
 - (iii) anchors are immediately available for use in an emergency, and capable of being used without power; and
 - (iv) all information from aids to navigation and charts is fully monitored.
- (b) While within Napier Pilotage Area all aids to navigation on board vessels, including but not limited to A.I.S, radar and depth recording devices, are to be in continuous operation and fully utilised.
- (c) The number of persons on the bridge of the vessel shall be sufficient to enable compliance with subclause (a) (i).

1.4.2 Duties of persons in charge of motor boats, yachts, launches etc. within Napier Pilotage Area

- (a) The Master of every vessel under 500 gross tons must not impede the navigation of any vessel of 500 gross tonnage or more when that vessel is navigating under pilotage within the Napier Pilotage Area.



Map 1.4 Napier Pilotage Area

Appendix 5: Correspondence between the Hawke's Bay Regional Council harbourmaster and Land Information New Zealand concerning Napier outward pilotage limit

- Napier Pilotage Area - Outwards pilotage limits

Page 1

From: @portofnapier.co.nz>
To: @linz.govt.nz>
Date: Wednesday, 7 December 2005 10:07:18 a.m.
Subject: Napier Pilotage Area - Outwards pilotage limits

Hi

The Outwards pilotage limits within Napier Pilotage Area are not marked on NZ 5712. I and I discussed this issue and feel that it would be helpful to ship's masters to have the outwards limit defined. Further pilotage information for the ship's master is included on the passage plan.

The definition of the Outwards limit is saved from HBRC Harbour Bylaws in the present HBRC Navigation & Safety Bylaws 2002. The sections that relate to limits are attached below:

PILOTS AND PILOTAGE

67. Subject to exemptions permitted by law, Inward Pilotage shall be compulsory for vessels of more than forty (40) metres overall length in all that part of the Pilotage District of the Port of Napier and the Master of each such vessel shall when their ship is being navigated in such part of the Pilotage District, employ a duly qualified Pilot for their vessel, unless they hold a Pilotage Exemption Certificate. The description of the said part in and for which Inward Pilotage is compulsory as aforesaid is as follows:

All the waters in and around Napier Harbour bounded by straight lines commencing from the high water mark in position 39° 26' OOS 176° 52' 45E extending due E. to longitude 176° 58' OOE, thence due S to latitude 39° 29' OOS, thence due W to the high water mark in position 39° 29' OOS 176° 55' 29'E thence by the line of high water to the position of commencement. — charted.

68. Subject to exemptions by law, Outward Pilotage shall be compulsory for vessels of more than forty (40) metres overall length.

In all that part described hereunder of the Pilotage District of the Port of Napier and the master of each such vessel shall when their ship is being navigated in such part of the Pilotage District, employ a duly qualified Pilot for their vessel, unless they hold a Pilotage Exemption Certificate. The description of the said part in and for which Outward Pilotage is compulsory as aforesaid is as follows:

All that part of the Pilotage District generally southward of a line running from the northern extremity of the breakwater in a true west direction to high water mark on the mainland.

69. Pilotage is optional in the remainder of the Pilotage District in all that part other than the parts described in subsections 67 and 68. of this By-law as parts in and for which Pilotage is compulsory.

70. No person other than a duly licensed Pilot shall act as a Pilot within the harbour.

Annex to Bylaws

Pilots and Pilotage

68 Delete

All that part of the Pilotage District generally southward of a line running from the northern extremity of the breakwater in a line west direction to high water mark on the mainland.

Insert

All that part of the Pilotage District southward of a line from South Pania Buoy (Position Lat.39o27.65 Long.176-55.82E) to the shore and westwards of a line 180 from South Pania Buoy to the Town Reef. Pilotage of outward vessels between "B" Buoy (position Lat.39o - 27.935 Long.176o - 54.86E) and the outward limits may be conducted by VHF from the pilot boat provided such procedure is incorporated in the "Passage Plan" and has been agreed by the Master of the vessel.

Please consider inserting the Outwards Pilotage limit on the new edition of Napier Harbour.

Thanks and regards - Charlie

Other

Remove the harbour limit and text 'Harbour Limit'. ✓

The pilotage limit on the current charts is to be renamed 'Inward Pilotage Limit'. Another pilotage limit is to be added from 39°27.65'S, 176°55.82E in a line at 270° westwards to the shore and 180° southwards to Town Reef. This area is to be named 'Outward Pilotage Limit'. The pilotage limits are shown diagrammatically on the Port of Napier pilotage limits plan. ✓

Remove the small craft symbols from the chart body and the small craft symbols key. Replace the small craft symbol for slipway (NZ 201 IU 5) with the text 'Ramp' (NZ 201 IF 23). If there is uncertainty as to the existence of any ramp, assume that there is not a ramp there and do not add the text. ✓

The NZ Geographic Board reference maps have been checked for new names and no amendments are required. Do not check the NZ Gazette for names. ✓

There is no history sheet for the new edition of NZ 571. ✓

The chart files have been checked. Any relevant information is included in this data pack. ✓

The relevant pages from the Admiralty NZ Pilot are supplied. The NZ Pilot is to be used for selecting names as appropriate. ✓

The service provider is responsible for making all Notice to Mariners amendments up to a reasonable cut off date. The chart NTM history and copies of individual NTMs are available on the LINZ hydro website at <http://www.hydro.linz.govt.nz/ntm/index.asp> ✓

Magnetic Detail

The service provider is to supply updated magnetic information and update the charts. ✓

The service provider is to recommend the compass rose size and positions for NZ 5612 to LINZ for approval. ✓

The service provider is to assess the compass rose size and positions on NZ 561 in relation to the surrounding chart detail. They are to contact LINZ with any improvements to the compass roses they think appropriate. ✓

Timing

Any issues or recommendations made by the service provider are to be brought to LINZ attention and any resulting amendments made prior to supply of deliverables number 2.



**Recent Marine Occurrence Reports published by
the Transport Accident Investigation Commission**

13-202	Bulk carrier, <i>IDAS Bulker</i> , pilotage incident Napier, Hawke's Bay, 8 August 2013
12-202	Fishing vessel <i>Torea</i> , collision with uncharted rock, Foveaux Strait, 24 August 2012
09-210	Bulk carrier, <i>Taharoa Express</i> , cargo shift, Port Taharoa, 16 December 2009
10-204	Inquiry 10-204: Bulk carrier <i>Hanjin Bombay</i> , grounding, Mount Maunganui, 21 June 2010
10-202	<i>M.V. Anatoki</i> , grounding, off Rangihaeata Head, Golden Bay, South Island, 6 May 2010
11-204	Interim Report Marine inquiry 11-204 Containership MV <i>Rena</i> grounding on Astrolabe Reef 5 October 2011
09-202	Marine Inquiry 09-202: Passenger vessel <i>Oceanic Discoverer</i> Fatal injury, Port of Napier 19 February 2009
11-201	Passenger vessel <i>Volendam</i> , lifeboat fatality, Port of Lyttelton, New Zealand, 8 January 2011
10-203	<i>Marsol Pride</i> , uncontrolled release of fire-extinguishing gas into engine room, Tui oil and gas field, 27 May 2010
09-204 and 09-207	Coastguard rescue vessel <i>Dive! Tutukaka Rescue</i> collision with rocks, Taiharuru River entrance Northland, 4 March 2009; Coastguard rescue vessel Trusts Rescue, heavy weather encounter, Manukau Bar, 31 May 2009
10-201	Bulk carrier <i>TPC Wellington</i> , double fatality resulting from enclosed space entry, Port Marsden, Northland, 3 May 2010
09-201	Collision: private jet-boat/private watercraft, Kawarau River, Queenstown, 5 January 2009
08-209	Loss of the rigid inflatable boat <i>Mugwop</i> , off the entrance to Lyttelton Harbour, 28 October 2008
11-201	Interim Factual report - Passenger vessel <i>Volendam</i> , lifeboat fatality, port of Lyttelton, New Zealand, 8 January 2011
08-205	Fishing vessel, <i>San Cuvier</i> , dragged anchor and grounded, Tarakeha Point, Bay of Plenty, 27 July 2008
08-206	Passenger ferry <i>Monte Stello</i> , collisions with wharfs, Picton and Wellington, 8 and 9 August 2008
09-205	Stern trawler <i>Pantas No.1</i> , fatality while working cargo, No.5 berth, Island Harbour, Bluff, 22 April 2009

Price \$16.00

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