This page displays a list of safety recommendations that relate to the rail mode. You can use the filter tool to refine the results and to search for keywords within the text of each recommendation.
Safety Recommendation
015/08
Issued To
NZTA
on 21 Aug 08
There is recurring evidence indicating that standards of maintenance of rolling stock on the national rail network as demanded in Veolia's and KiwiRail's safety cases is lower than preferable and reasonable in that for example:
- manufacturers' inspection, repair and maintenance instructions are not always documented and followed
- safety critical components are not always identified and documented
- work instructions for maintaining safety-critical equipment are not always issued and work on safety-critical components is not always signed off by someone other than the maintainer
- some maintenance is not recorded.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
NZTA is working closely with rail industry participants to implement the safety recommendation
Safety Recommendation
016/08
Issued To
NZTA
on 21 Aug 08
There is no requirement for operators of passenger trains to have effective communication between the locomotive engineer and the on-board person in chage of passenger operations that will facilitate good crew resource management and be effective in emergency situations.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
NZTA is working closely with rail industry participants to implement the safety recommendation
Safety Recommendation
017/08
Issued To
NZTA
on 21 Aug 08
The date by which all passenger trains were required by the NRSS to be fitted with event recorders was extended by the rail participants without consulting with and getting spproval from New Zealand Transport Agency.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
NZTA is working closely with rail industry participants to implement the safety recommendation
Safety Recommendation
018/08
Issued To
NZTA
on 21 Aug 08
The scope and depth of the New Zealand Transport Agency Programme for rail participants might now be appropriate for the license hodlers being assessed, audited or otherwise and auditors do not make full use of the information available that signals potential area of system weaknesses; information from accident and incident reports and recommendations being examples of some of the information available.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
NZTA is working closely with rail industry participants to implement the safety recommendation
Safety Recommendation
003/08
Issued To
Land Transport NZ
on 20 Mar 08
The Commission considers that the lack of effective severe/adverse weather forecasting, and real-time monitoring of rainfall in the Johnsonville Line area, and other areas of track prone to closure during heavy rainfall events to be a safety issue and recommends the Director of Land Transport New Zealand addresses this safety issue.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
Safety Recommendation
004/08
Issued To
Land Transport NZ
on 20 Mar 08
The Commission considers that not having a weather proofing engineering review done of the Johnsonville Line is a safety issue and recommends the Director of Land Transport New Zealand addresses this safety issue.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
Safety Recommendation
005/08
Issued To
Land Transport NZ
on 20 Mar 08
The Commission considers that clearly defining procedures outlining responsibilities for monitoring, intervening or cancelling train operations during severe/adverse weather events is a safety issue and recommends the Director of Land Transport New Zealand addresses this safety issue.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
Safety Recommendation
006/08
Issued To
Land Transport NZ
on 20 Mar 08
The Commission considers it is a safety issue that the practice of conducting routine track inspections at night, and the lack of clear guidelines for the conduct of special track inspections of the Johnsonville Line is not in line with sound engineering practices. The Commission recommends the Director of Land Transport New Zealand addresses this safety issue.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
Safety Recommendation
035/07
Issued To
Land Transport NZ
on 26 Sep 07
Note the failures of the regulatory system to detect shortcomings in the maintenance of infrastructure (as presented in the Commission?s report 05-116: collapse of the Nuhaka Bridge under a work train) and shortcomings in the construction and commissioning process for newly modified rolling stock (as presented in this report), and;
Take a more strategic approach to risk management of the rail industry, and in particular take more of a leadership role in setting, changing and monitoring compliance with national standards for rail infrastructure and rolling stock, and the interaction between these components of the rail system.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
In previous correspondence (dated 26 September 2007) to TAIC, Land Transport NZ responded to this recommendation by noting the failure of, firstly, the maintenance system that led to the collapse of the Nuhaka Bridge and, secondly, in the commissioning and construction process that led to the Meadowbank incident. These responses did not note any failure in the regulatory system as stated in your recommendation, as Land Transport NZ does not attribute the cause of the two incidents investigated by TAIC to failure of the regulatory system.
In regard to the second part of the recommendation, Land Transport NZ has recently reviewed its rail regulatory activities within the context of the co-regulatory New Zealand rail system. As a result of the review, initiatives are currently being developed that will enable the Rail Regulation team to take a more strategic, proactive approach to its role. This is an on-going process and taking a more strategic approach does not have a "completely implemented" end date, as requested in your letter. However, a number of initiatives should be in place by 30 June 2008 that will enhance the strategic capability of the Rail Regulation team.
Safety Recommendation
012/07
Issued To
Land Transport NZ
on 19 Jun 07
review Toll Rail?s compliance monitoring of locomotive engineers to confirm that the increased monitoring as defined in the safety action of
21 February 2006 has been implemented and is effective.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
Land Transport New Zealand accepts this recommendation and will ensure that this is confirmed during the next annual safety assessment that is conducted on Toll Rail. The next assessment is scheduled for March 2008.
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