This page displays a list of safety recommendations that relate to the aviation mode. You can use the filter tool to refine the results and to search for keywords within the text of each recommendation.
Safety Recommendation
001/11
Issued To
CAA
on 24 Feb 11
The pilot on this occasion did not make what would have been an appropriate urgency or distress call when faced with a strong smell of fuel and the single engine indicating reduced performance.
The Commission has commented in previous reports on the need for pilots to declare the appropriate level of urgency using the standard phraseology for the situation.
The Commission recommends that the Director of Civil Aviation promote to all pilots and operators, through the best means available, the need to use the appropriate phraseology to declare a level of urgency or distress that reflects the true nature of an emergency.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
On 21 March 2011 the Civil Aviation Authority advised that in response to the recommendation it is intended that the 2012 series of AvKiwi safety seminars for pilots around New Zealand will focus on radio communications, including the need for pilots to declare the appropriate level of urgency using standard phraseology for the situation. However, while the use of correct phraseology in various situations will be promoted, the pilot-in-command still needs to make the appropriate decision in the first instance.
Safety Recommendation
045/10
Issued To
CAA
on 31 Aug 10
The interpretation of SIGMETs could be improved by the use of clearer reference to geographical regions, although the requirement to conform to ICAO Standards and Recommended Procedures is appreciated.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
The Authority accepts in principle the proposed safety recommendation.
Safety Recommendation
036/10
Issued To
CAA
on 18 Aug 10
Inquiries into this and previous incidents involving air traffic controllers have relied on radar and radiotelephone recordings, and the statements made by the air traffic controllers. However, verbal communications between controllers in the same work space is critical and integral element of the process for controlling aircraft but are currently not recorded. Without controller-station local area recordings, investigations will not always be able to identify all the contributing factors to an incident or accident and therefore valuable learnings might be lost.
The Commission believes this is a safety issue that the Director needs to address by initiating discussions with industry with a view to mandating the installation of air traffic controller station local-area recordings and providing the appropriate level of protection for such recordings as intended by ICAO for the purposes of assisting any future safety investigations.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
I appreciate the thrust of the Commission?s recommendation. As previously advised, I am prepared to engage with civil aviation participants (in particular the Airways Corporation) with a view to encouraging voluntary introduction of air-traffic controller station local area recording.
As you may be aware, mandating installation of local area recording systems is likely to require Civil Aviation Rule and legislative development/changes. In either case, a well developed safety case will be necessary to progress the work. While I appreciate that the Commission is seeking that I initiate discussions with industry to help facilitate a safety case being developed, the Commission may also be well positioned to assist in the development of a safety case that would eventually lead to Civil Aviation Rule or legislative change. I would welcome any assistance the Commission can lend on this front, and would invite your officers to engage with my staff to help clarify the requirements of a safety case.
Safety Recommendation
015/10
Issued To
CAA
on 10 May 10
In spite of the education material produced by the Civil Aviation Authority on hand-starting aircraft, the understanding of the risks associated with that activity were not well recognised by this operator and might not be with other operators in that sector of the industry.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
Safety Recommendation
010/10
Issued To
CAA
on 22 Apr 10
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
Safety Recommendation
008/10
Issued To
CAA
on 16 Dec 09
The late notification of this incident hampered the Commission?s investigation, because potentially valuable CVR information was not preserved. The Commission has noted recently that other serious incidents have not been notified as soon as practicable to the CAA, and in some cases the delays have affected the Commission?s decision whether to investigate. The Commission and the CAA rely on being immediately notified of serious incidents in order to be able to conduct effective investigations and to learn the lessons to prevent accidents. Late notifications prevent the Commission from meeting its statutory obligations.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
Safety Recommendation
026/09
Issued To
CAA
on 17 Aug 09
the need for CAA staff to monitor aerodrome operations, particularly at non-certificated aerodromes, to ensure safety efforts are best directed to promote the coordinated safe management of flying activities.
Implementation Status:
Closed acceptable
Reply:
Safety Recommendation
027/09
Issued To
CAA
on 17 Aug 09
the need to encourage good aviation practice to help ensure pilots know how to perform an effective visual scan and how to actively listen to radio calls.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
Safety Recommendation
028/09
Issued To
CAA
on 17 Aug 09
the need to review the operations at other aerodromes around New Zealand that have opposing circuits, to assess and minimise the potential for a mid-air collision.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
Safety Recommendation
012/09
Issued To
CAA
on 23 Apr 09
Take action to address the safety issues discussed in the recommendations of the specialist independent aeronautical engineer?s review of the STC process, listed below:
The CAA should make the introduction of a redesigned fin for all FU24?s a very high priority.
The Continued Airworthiness programme for the Walter Fletcher should be reviewed including the 150-hr maintenance periodicity to ensure that the lessons of several years of operation have been applied and that potential fatigue effects of operation with higher powered engines are properly accounted for. Any learning applicable to piston-powered aircraft should be disseminated widely.
The Type Certificate holder should be involved where applicable.
The CAA should clarify the divisions of responsibility for Continued Airworthiness of modified FU24 Aircraft between the original equipment manufacturer (PAL), STC holders, and design organizations.
The Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review and the Part 137 Rules rewrite should be completed and acted on as soon as possible.
Implementation Status:
Open
Reply:
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